CONNECTICUT

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 49

FEBRUARY 2017

NUMBER 3

Article
The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery
BEN GRUNWALD
Under traditional rules of criminal discovery, defendants are entitled to little
prosecutorial evidence and are thus forced to negotiate plea agreements and
prepare for trial in the dark. In an effort to expand defendants’ discovery rights, a
number of states have recently enacted “open-file” statutes, which require the
government to share the fruits of its investigation with the defense. Legal scholars
have widely supported these reforms, claiming that they level the playing field and
promote judicial efficiency by decreasing trials and speeding up guilty pleas. But
these predictions are based largely on intuition and anecdotal data without
extended theoretical analysis or systematic empirical testing.
This Article aims to fill both of these gaps in the literature. It begins by
developing a dynamic theory of the effects of open-file on the behavior of police,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and defendants. The theory leads to the conclusion
that the anticipated effects of open-file are fragile and contingent on a range of
extrinsic institutional circumstances, including the distribution of cases in which
defendants over- and under-estimate the strength of the government’s evidence, the
availability of public defense funding, and the adaptive behavior of police and
prosecutors in the collection of evidence and assembly of the file. The Article then
examines the effects of open-file empirically using data from two states that have
expanded their discovery statutes in the last decade. It finds relatively little evidence
that defendants fared significantly better in terms of charging, plea bargaining, and
sentencing or that the trial rate fell as a result of the legislation.
If the effects of open-file are indeed so fragile and contingent, then it may offer
little utility as a standalone fix. We need, instead, to find the will to integrate
discovery legislation into a package of reforms that increase funding for indigent
defense and that establish stronger enforcement mechanisms to ensure the
government complies with its discovery obligations.
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The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery
BEN GRUNWALD*
INTRODUCTION
Traditional discovery gets it backwards. In civil cases—where money is
so often the only thing at stake—discovery is endless. But in criminal
court—where life and liberty are on the line—defendants are entitled to little
prosecutorial evidence and must negotiate plea agreements and prepare for
trial in the dark.
Since the 1970s, many states have addressed this problem by
substantially expanding criminal discovery through statute. The last decade
has witnessed a new wave of reform, often referred to as “open” or “openfile” discovery.1 In 2004, for example, North Carolina abandoned “a highly
traditional, restrictive discovery procedure that guaranteed only minimal
disclosure to the defense”2 and adopted the “broadest criminal discovery
rights and duties in the nation.”3 Roughly a decade later, Texas enacted a
discovery statute nearly as broad.4 And around the same time, Ohio
expanded its discovery rules as well.5
The scholarly reception of these reforms has been overwhelmingly
positive, emphasizing two primary claims—one about the content of case
outcomes and the other about efficiency. First, legal scholars, including
Darryl Brown and Daniel Medwed, uniformly maintain that open-file helps
level the investigative playing field by sharing the fruits of the government’s
superior investigative apparatus.6 And others, like Stephen Schulhofer and
*
Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
For helpful comments and discussion, special thanks to Miriam Baer, Will Baude, Stephanos Bibas,
Adam Chilton, Paul Crane, Ryan Doerfler, Tom Ginsburg, Todd Henderson, Hadar Aviram, William
Hubbard, Aziz Huq, Andrew Chongseh Kim, Genevieve Lakier, Kay Levine, Charles Loeffler, John
MacDonald, Jonathan Masur, Richard McAdams, Tracey Meares, Tom Miles, Judith Miller, Michael
Pollack, Eric Posner, John Rappaport, Daniel Richman, Danielle Rosenthal, Meghan Ryan, Lior
Strahilevitz, Laura Weinrib, and Jonathan Witmer-Rich.
1
Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike
Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 263 (2008).
2
Id. at 260.
3
Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform after Connick and Garcetti, 77 BROOK.
L. REV. 1329, 1380 (2012).
4
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West 2015).
5
See OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16.
6
See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal
Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1624 (2005) (“[B]road discovery partially compensates for
restricted defense counsel; it helps make up for the deficiency in adversary process of constrained defense
advocacy.”); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1558–59
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Máximo Langer, assert that broad discovery “directly address[es] the flaws
of plea bargaining”7 and creates “a strong check to prevent prosecutors from
making plea proposals [when] conviction at trial is unlikely.”8 Under this
view, defendants obtain more favorable outcomes as a result of discovery
reform. Second, scholars and policy advocates widely claim that open-file
discourages trials and speeds up guilty pleas.9 They reason that greater
disclosure reduces information asymmetries between the parties and thus
increases the chance they can agree on a settlement.
The problem is that these predictions are based largely on intuition and
anecdotal data without extended theoretical analysis10 or systematic
(2010) (“Open file discovery more generally would level the playing field by giving defendants a bird’s
eye view into the exact nature of the government’s case.”); see also THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EXPANDED
DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES 2–4 (2007) [hereinafter JUSTICE PROJECT] (“[Open-file] protects against
wrongful imprisonment and renders more reliable convictions” and “creates a more level playing field
on which the quality of evidence can be challenged and tested.”); Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and
Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 968–97 (1989) (arguing that increased
disclosure of evidence improves the accuracy of plea agreements); Moore, supra note 3, at 1372
(“Providing defendants with information obtained through [the] government’s superior investigative
resources levels the playing field.”); Eleanor J. Ostrow, The Case for Preplea Disclosure, 90 YALE L.J.
1581, 1608–09 (1981) (arguing that pre-plea discovery would produce “bargains that are fairer to the
defendant”); Dan Svirsky, The Cost of Strict Discovery: A Comparison of Manhattan and Brooklyn
Criminal Cases, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 523, 528 (2014) (“[Discovery] counteracts the
government’s financial and investigative advantages [and] levels the playing field . . . .”).
7
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1998 (1992); see also
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2469, 2531
(2004) (arguing that liberal discovery decreases uncertainty and checks prosecutorial bluffing).
8
Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial
Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 276 (2006); see also id. (“[F]rom
the perspective of eliminating . . . the coercive character of plea proposals based on weak evidence, the
broader the pre-guilty-plea discovery, the better. This is why an open-file policy at the prosecutor’s office
would be the best option.”).
9
See, e.g., Moore, supra note 3, at 1383 (concluding based on anecdotal evidence that “[f]ull open
file discovery appears to be increasing the speed . . . of plea bargaining.”); Jenny Roberts, Too Little Too
Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal
Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1100, 1154–55 (2004) (“[T]here will be . . . savings in the
probability that pleas will happen earlier if the defendant has an opportunity to view the government’s
evidence.”); Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 274 (noting that in the
“European continental justice system, the defense and prosecution have access to the same collection of
evidence” and “[t]here is not a shred of evidence that these criminal justice systems have suffered any
drop in efficiency as a result”); see also BILL ANALYSIS, S. 83-1611, 83rd Reg. Sess., 1 (Tex. 2013)
(supporting open-file bill because it would contribute to “increasing efficient resolution of cases”);
JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 6, at 9 (“Early discovery . . . will likely result in fewer trials . . . .”); LEGAL
AID SOC’Y, CRIMINAL DISCOVERY REFORM IN NEW YORK 30 (2009) (“[F]ar more guilty pleas will be
entered earlier in the case when defendants receive a prompt opportunity to actually see tangible proof
of the strength of the prosecution’s evidence . . . .”); N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY 4 (2014) (“Open discovery . . . encourages guilty people to plead guilty earlier in the
proceedings by showing them the evidence against them.”); REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE TO THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 3–4 (2003) (arguing that open-file encourages faster plea agreements); TEX. DEF. SERV.,
IMPROVING DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES IN TEXAS: HOW BEST PRACTICES CONTRIBUTE TO
GREATER JUSTICE 1–2 (2013) (arguing that open-file discourages trials).
10
One exception is John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
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empirical testing. This Article aims to fill both gaps in the literature by
developing a dynamic theory of the effects of open-file on the behavior of
police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and defendants, and then by testing
the resulting hypotheses with data from two jurisdictions that have adopted
open-file.
My theoretical analysis proceeds in several steps. Drawing inspiration
from a larger body of work on civil discovery,12 I begin in Section II by
observing that incentives built into the plea bargaining process already
encourage voluntary prosecutorial disclosure, even in jurisdictions with
traditional discovery rules. Expanding discovery should have the biggest
impact on disclosure where these incentives are weak due to prosecutorial
resource constraints, pooling advantages, the value of trial surprise, and a
few other considerations. In Section III, I turn to open-file statutes and
demonstrate that prior scholarship, which generally examines each statute in
isolation,13 overlooks significant inter-jurisdictional variation. Certain
discovery statutes—for example, those that impose fewer disclosure costs
on the defense, that establish stronger compliance mechanisms for the
government, and that require immediate judicial oversight when prosecutors
elect to withhold discoverable evidence—likely encourage more disclosure,
earlier in the process. In Section IV, having fleshed out the effects of openfile on disclosure, I then explore how changes in disclosure reshape the
behavior of the parties throughout the criminal process. The resulting theory
produces three primary claims.
First, while there are good grounds to believe that open-file leads to
more favorable outcomes for defendants,14 the effects may not be as big as
we hope due to other systemic features of the criminal justice system. For
11

Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 487–504 (2001), which examines disclosure incentives under Brady but
does not consider the effect of discovery statutes, the focus of this Article.
11
To my knowledge, the only empirical study of open-file discovery that uses objective court data
examined the time-to-disposition in just two hundred cases in two criminal courts in New York City—
one with a stingy prosecutor’s office, the other with a liberal one. See Svirsky, supra note 6, at 543. The
author detected no statistically significant difference. Id. Another recent study surveyed prosecutors and
defense attorneys in North Carolina and Virginia to measure subjective perceptions of disclosure
practices in those two states. Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery
in Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 288 (2016).
12
See e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND
J. ECON. 404, 406–12 (1984) (modeling disclosure behavior in civil court); Steven Shavell, Sharing of
Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation, 20 RAND J. ECON. 183, 184–92 (1989) (same); Bruce L.
Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481, 483–97 (1994) (same).
13
See, e.g., Cynthia E. Hujar Orr & Robert G. Rodery, The Michael Morton Act: Minimizing
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J. 407, 409, 413–19 (2015) (examining the Texas open-file
statute); Charles L. Grove, Criminal Discovery in Ohio: “Civilizing” Criminal Rule 16, 36 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 143, 145–64 (2011) (examining Ohio’s rules of criminal procedure); Moore, supra note 3, at
1372 (examining the North Carolina open-file statute); Mosteller, supra note 1, at 260, 275–76 (same).
14
Indeed, it has made a big difference in a number of highly publicized cases. See, e.g., Mosteller,
supra note 1, at 292–93 (discussing the role of the North Carolina open-file statute in the Duke lacrosse
case).
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one thing, in many cases the file may not contain material of much use to
the defense. One reason is that the file does not represent an impartial
construction of the crime.15 Rather, it is the product of a highly routinized
process that is designed to produce inculpatory evidence and that is carried
out by police and prosecutors who seek convictions.16 Even more important,
indigent defense is chronically underfunded in many areas of the country.17
Burdened by heavy caseloads, many defense attorneys may lack the time
and resources to carefully examine the contents of a discovery package or to
conduct a vigorous follow-up investigation.18
Second, it’s not clear that open-file reduces the trial rate or speeds up
pleas. When the defense underestimates the government’s evidence, openfile discourages trials by decreasing the optimism of the defendant’s
estimate of the expected outcome at trial. But when the defense
overestimates the prosecution’s evidence, discovery increases the distance
between the parties’ trial estimates and, in turn, decreases the chance of
settlement. The effect of open-file on the trial rate depends, then, on the
relative distribution of these different cases—an empirical question for
which we have little information. The empirical literature also shows that
litigants form biased estimates of the strength of evidence.19 By increasing
the evidence available—and particularly exculpatory evidence—open-file
may increase the distance between the parties’ trial estimates and decrease
the probability of settlement.
Third, the arms of open-file discovery are longer than prior scholarship
has appreciated. Open-file may reach both forward and backward in time,
affecting stages in the criminal process other than plea bargaining and trial.
Increased disclosure, for example, may discourage some police officers from
collecting or recording exculpatory evidence or from engaging in
investigative activities likely to produce it. Added discovery costs may also
lead prosecutor’s offices with tight budgets to file charges in fewer cases to
reduce their discovery burdens. Increased disclosure of inculpatory evidence
may invigorate enforcement of the Fourth Amendment through motions to
suppress. It might also lead defense attorneys to shift pre-trial litigation away
from factual claims of substantive criminal law and towards procedural
claims, which are less time-consuming to litigate.20 And higher discovery
See infra Section IV.A.
Id.
17
See infra Section IV.F.
18
See, e.g., Mosteller, supra note 1, at 298–99 (noting that “few defense attorneys” could afford to
invest sixty to one hundred hours learning about DNA analysis and reviewing over a thousand pages of
test results to uncover key exculpatory evidence, as one defense attorney did in the Duke lacrosse case).
19
See infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
20
See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE. L.J. 1, 37–40 (1997) (arguing that defense attorneys focus on procedural defenses,
rather than merits defenses, because they are on average more cost-effective for their clients in the
aggregate).
15
16
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costs may also increase trial penalties or plea discounts. Indeed, one
defendant’s right to discovery is another’s right to exchange it for lenience.
For these three reasons, the plea bargaining and discovery process is
more complicated than the literature has appreciated. We simply cannot
theorize our way out of this puzzle. To understand the full effect of openfile on criminal justice outcomes, we need data. Pushing the scholarly
literature one step forward in that direction, Section V next examines data
on several million cases from North Carolina and Texas.
Estimating the effect of discovery reform poses several big challenges.
First, case-level data on state criminal court is difficult to obtain. Instead, I
rely on monthly or annual aggregate data. Second, changes to statutory law
affect all courts in a given jurisdiction at the same time, making causal
inference difficult. While I flirt at times with more sophisticated approaches
to causal inference—e.g., exploiting subsets of cases where open-file does
not formally apply—I primarily rely on before-and-after comparisons. Still,
basic descriptive data on how case processing does or does not change after
the adoption of open-file adds valuable empirical insight in an area where
we know so little.
I begin by examining prosecutorial disclosure activity. Although there
is some anecdotal evidence that open-file increases the volume of disclosure,
we have relatively little systematic data.21 As a second-best proxy, I examine
data on motion-to-suppress hearings in Texas based on the assumption that
defense attorneys file more motions to suppress when they receive more
information about the inculpatory evidence collected by the prosecution. I
find that the number of hearings increased substantially in the year after the
state enacted its open-file statute. It is difficult to translate these results into
an estimate of the size of the change in disclosure and litigation activity, but
they support the hypothesis that open-file affected both.
Next, I explore the effect of open-file on intermediate and final case
outcomes: the rate of charges, trials, pleas to lesser-included offenses,
dismissals, and sentences, and the time-to-disposition. While my methods
are rough, and there are a few bumps and blips in the data, I find relatively
little evidence that defendants fared significantly better in terms of charging,
plea bargaining, and sentencing, or that the trial rate or time-to-disposition
fell as a result of open-file.
Why aren’t defendants faring better? And, if these results hold up to
more rigorous empirical scrutiny, what normative implications do they
have? I suggest that the effects of open-file are fragile and contingent on a
range of extrinsic institutional circumstances: most importantly, on the
availability of resources for public defense; on the myopia of police
investigations; and on the adaptive behavior of police and prosecutors in the
collection of evidence and assembly of the file. As a result, open-file may
21

For one useful and recent exception, see Turner & Redlich, supra note 11.
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not work as a standalone fix. We may need to find the will to integrate
discovery legislation into a package of reforms that increase funding for
indigent defense and that ensure police and prosecutors comply with their
discovery obligations.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. In Section I, I discuss
the limited rights of defendants under the traditional framework of criminal
discovery. In Section II, I identify incentives built into the plea bargaining
process to explore how and when prosecutors engage in voluntary
disclosure under this framework. Section III explores how variations in the
design of open-file statutes can affect the volume and timing of
prosecutorial disclosure. Section IV, in turn, examines how changes in
prosecutorial disclosure influence behavior in both downstream and
upstream phases of the criminal process. Section V introduces data to test
some of my theoretical hypotheses and discusses the normative
implications of my findings. The Conclusion then outlines a research
agenda for future empirical work in this area. Perhaps most importantly, it
shows how the theory of discovery developed in this paper generates new
empirical predictions that can help reveal whether the difference in
sentences in cases disposed by guilty plea and trial represents a plea
discount or a trial penalty—a question that is closely connected to the
motivation for open-file and that has broader implications for the criminal
justice system.
I. TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
In jurisdictions with traditional systems of criminal discovery, the rights
of defendants to the prosecution’s evidence arise from the United States
Constitution, state statutes, and local court rules.
The United States Supreme Court first recognized a constitutional right
to discovery in Brady v. Maryland.22 There, the court held that criminal
defendants are entitled to receive “material” and “exculpatory” evidence
held by the government.23 Evidence is exculpatory if it tends to decrease the
probability of guilt or the severity of punishment.24 It is material if there is
“a reasonable probability” that disclosure would have led to a different result
of the proceeding.25
In states with traditional discovery, Brady is supplemented by a
patchwork of statutes and court rules that vary in scope. Commentators often
group these provisions in relation to two models.26 The first and narrowest
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Id. at 87.
24
Id. at 87–88.
25
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
26
See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.2(b) (5th ed. 2009)
(categorizing discovery provisions).
22
23
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model is Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Over a dozen
states model their defense discovery rights on this federal rule,27 as did both
North Carolina and Texas before their recent discovery reforms.28 Painting
with a broad brush, these states only grant defendants discovery of their own
statements, their own criminal record, and “a limited list of evidence that is
either material to the defense or that the prosecution intends to introduce” at
trial.29 Further, with respect to the prior statements of witnesses the
prosecution intends to introduce, the federal courts and many states permit
the prosecution to wait to disclose until after those witnesses have testified
at trial.30 Even then, the defendant is only entitled to prior written statements
that are signed or adopted by the witness or are “verbatim” transcriptions.31
The second model comes from the first edition of the ABA’s
recommended standards for discovery.32 About thirty states provide
defendants with broader discovery than the federal rule by partially or fully
embracing these standards,33 which are more generous with respect to both
witness lists and witnesses’ prior statements. For example, they require
disclosure of written or recorded statements of the prosecution’s witnesses
before trial.34
The limitations of the traditional approach to discovery are wellknown.35 Perhaps most clearly, its substantive scope is narrow. Brady only
requires disclosure of exculpatory evidence that satisfies a stringent
materiality standard36 and does not require disclosure of inculpatory
evidence at all.37 Traditional discovery statutes and court rules expand
defendants’ discovery rights further, but they often leave out key categories
Id.
See JOHN RUBIN & ALYSON A. GRINE, NORTH CAROLINA DEFENDER MANUAL § 4.3 (2d ed.
2013), http://defendermanuals.sog.unc.edu/defender-manual/2 [https://perma.cc/V5QW-M7VV] (noting
that North Carolina’s prior statute provided discovery that was “comparable to the discovery available in
federal criminal cases”); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 26, § 20.2(b) (noting that Texas’s prior
discovery statute was “roughly equivalent in scope to Federal Rule 16”).
29
Mosteller, supra note 1, at 274.
30
See Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (2012). Some jurisdictions modify the federal rule, requiring
disclosure at least ten days before trial. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-16-4 (2010).
31
18 U.S.C. § 3500(e).
32
ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (1st
ed. 1970).
33
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 26, § 20.2(B).
34
Id. § 20.3(i).
35
For more extensive discussion of this issue, see Medwed, supra note 6, at 1539–44; Moore, supra
note 3, at 1342–46; Mosteller, supra note 1, at 309–10.
36
See KATHLEEN RIDOLFI ET AL., MATERIAL INDIFFERENCE: HOW COURTS ARE IMPEDING FAIR
DISCLOSURE IN CRIMINAL CASES 14 (2014), https://www.nacdl.org/discoveryreform/materialindifferen
ce/ [https://perma.cc/Y457-ZYFQ] (reporting that withheld exculpatory evidence was deemed material
in just 21 out of 145 surveyed judicial decisions).
37
See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“It does not follow from [Brady] that the
prosecution must reveal before trial the names of all witnesses who will testify unfavorably. There is no
general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one . . . .”).
27
28
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of evidence like the prior statements of witnesses the prosecution does not
intend to call at trial.
Timing is another problem, particularly for Brady. Among cases that go
to trial, courts generally agree that Brady is satisfied if the evidence is
disclosed “in time for its effective use at trial.”38 In many jurisdictions,
disclosure during trial is sufficient for many kinds of evidence.39 Even
worse, Brady may very well not apply in cases disposed by guilty plea,
which account for the vast majority of convictions. Indeed, the Supreme
Court unanimously held in United States v. Ruiz that Brady does not require
the disclosure of impeachment evidence before a plea agreement.40 And the
Court could extend Ruiz to non-impeachment evidence in the future.41
Furthermore, even when prosecutors are legally obligated to disclose,
they may still fail to comply. First, cultural and professional norms may
overemphasize convictions over justice, leading some prosecutors to
withhold discoverable evidence to protect conviction rates,42 particularly if
they learn about the evidence late in the criminal process.43 Second,
38
United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Smith Grading
and Paving, Inc., 760 F.2d 527, 532 (4th Cir. 1985); State v. Taylor, 473 S.E.2d 596, 607 (N.C. 1996).
39
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 26, § 20.3(m).
40
536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).
41
The Court rejected a functional distinction between impeachment and non-impeachment
evidence in the context of Brady in the past. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (“This
Court has rejected any such distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence.”); see
also Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has consistently treated
exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the same way for the purpose of defining the obligation of a
prosecutor to provide Brady material . . . .”). And in the wake of Ruiz, a number of courts and
commentators have concluded that Brady does not require pre-plea disclosure of non-impeachment
evidence. See United States v. Mathur, 624 F.3d 498, 507 (1st Cir. 2010) (rejecting the defendant’s
argument that Brady applies pre-plea); Friedman, 618 F.3d at 154 (asserting as alternative grounds for
the decision that Ruiz applies to exculpatory evidence); United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 178 (5th
Cir. 2009) (holding that “a guilty plea precludes the defendant from asserting a Brady violation”); Jones
v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 315 n.5 (4th Cir. 2002) (asserting that Ruiz forecloses the argument that
undisclosed exculpatory evidence can invalidate an otherwise voluntary plea); People v. Philips, 30
A.D.2d 621, 621–22 (N.Y. App. 2d Dep’t 2006) (rejecting the defendant’s claims since “[b]y pleading
guilty, the defendant forfeited his right to seek review of any alleged . . . Brady violation”); see also
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 26, § 20.3(m); Bibas, supra note 7, at 2494 n.125 (noting that the “Court’s
reasoning [in Ruiz] would apply with almost as much force to classic Brady exculpatory material”); Brian
Gregory, Comment, Brady is the Problem: Wrongful Convictions and the Case for “Open File” Criminal
Discovery, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 819, 826 (2012) (recognizing that prior to Ruiz the court rejected any
distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence); JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 6,
at 20 (“[T]he Brady ruling only applied to cases that go to trial . . . .”). But see Ferrara v. United States,
456 F.3d 278, 297–98 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose
certain exculpatory information prior to the defendant’s guilty plea).
42
See Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 488 (2009)
(“[S]cholars have focused less on the Brady doctrine itself than on the prosecutors whom Brady governs,
arguing that the materiality requirement enables overzealous prosecutors to avoid their constitutional and
ethical obligations to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense.”).
43
See Miriam Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 35–38 (2015) (explaining how, for the
prosecutors assigned to a case, the costs of disclosing exculpatory evidence grow over time).
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discovery rules are under-enforced. Violations are rarely detected, and even
when they are, sanctions are rarely imposed due to stringent materiality and
harmless-error standards.44 When sanctions are imposed, they rarely impose
significant costs on the prosecution. Indeed, when violations are detected
before conviction, the most common remedy is for the court to order the
violating party to disclose. Courts rarely exclude evidence, dismiss charges,
or vacate convictions for discovery violations,45 and prosecutors rarely face
professional discipline.46 Third, it is difficult for prosecutors to determine
whether evidence is “material”—a standard that defines both the scope of
Brady and some traditional discovery statutes. The standard is vague and its
application is subject to wide disagreement.47 Moreover, prosecutors must
apply it before trial—before they know what evidence will be admitted and
what strategy the defense will adopt.48 Their judgments about materiality
may also be distorted by a variety of psychological biases.49 And due to high
caseloads, prosecutors may lack the time to closely review the files for
discoverable evidence.50 For these reasons, many legal scholars have
concluded that traditional discovery is inadequate.51
II. VOLUNTARY PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE
Despite the limited prosecutorial duties under traditional discovery and
their associated compliance problems, the government may nonetheless
disclose significant evidence to defendants voluntarily. Yet criminal law
scholars have given relatively little attention to voluntary disclosure. The
RIDOLFI ET AL., supra note 36, at 14.
See LAURAL HOOPER ET AL., A SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO A NATIONAL SURVEY OF RULE 16
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL CASES 29
(2011), www.uscourts.gov/file/17996/download [https://perma.cc/KSY6-Q5BF] (surveying discovery
practices in federal district courts).
46
See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009 3 (2010) (finding that the California Bar
“almost never disciplines” prosecutors for Brady violations); Bill Moushey, Hiding the
Facts: Discovery Violations Have Made Evidence-Gathering a Shell Game, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Nov. 24, 1998, at A1 (finding that prosecutors who violated discovery rules were “seldom
punished” even though “[m]any violated discovery rules over and over again”).
47
One study asked over thirty prosecutors to answer whether specific evidence was material under
Brady and found wide disagreement in a number of different factual circumstances. See Bennett L.
Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 690 (2006) (citing JOHN JAY
LEGAL CLINIC, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIM STATEMENTS: BRADY OR NOT? 1–6 (2000)).
48
See Gregory, supra note 41, at 829 (“[T]he current rule forces prosecutors and appellate judges
to engage in speculation, before trial and on appeal respectively, as to whether disclosure of a piece of
evidence would ‘deprive the defendant of a fair trial.’”); Moore, supra note 3, at 1343 (“Brady’s
materiality test imposes upon prosecutors as much a duty of divination as disclosure.”).
49
See Burke, supra note 42, at 494–95 (“Brady amplifies confirmation bias, selective information
processing, and the resistance to cognitive dissonance in a manner that guarantees that when prosecutors
err they will do so by systematically underestimating materiality.”).
50
Moore, supra note 3, at 1342.
51
See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 6, at 1560; Moore, supra note 3, at 1350.
44
45
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largely unspoken conventional view appears to be that prosecutors disclose
inculpatory evidence and withhold exculpatory evidence unless disclosure
is required by Brady. But this view oversimplifies a more complicated story.
In this Section, I outline a more complete account of voluntary
disclosure. I begin by introducing a classic theory of litigation in which the
parties’ behavior is governed by the shadow of trial—that is, the expected
outcome of trial. Then, drawing on insights from the civil discovery
literature, I explain how incentives built into the plea bargaining process
encourage the prosecution to eliminate information asymmetries through
voluntary disclosure even absent formal discovery requirements. This
analysis clarifies where the incentives for voluntary disclosure are weakest
and where open-file may therefore have the biggest effect.
A. The Shadow of Trial
Scholars of both civil and criminal law have widely adopted a basic
theory of litigation that predicts when a dispute will be settled out of court,
and if so, the content of the settlement agreement.52 It begins by observing
that a trial is an expensive way to resolve a dispute. If the parties can
accurately estimate the expected outcome of trial, they can obtain the same
outcome through settlement and share the avoided costs of further litigation.
Two key variables affect the likelihood and content of settlement.
First, the parties form estimates of the expected outcome at trial. The
closer the parties’ estimates are to each other, the more likely a settlement
can be reached. And, the higher the estimates, the higher the settlement will
be. In arriving at their estimates, the parties consider the balance of favorable
and unfavorable evidence they anticipate will be introduced in court and the
burden of proof for the relevant legal standard.
The second key variable is the parties’ willingness to accept a
suboptimal settlement—a settlement that is less desirable than their trial
estimates. Greater willingness among the parties increases the likelihood of
settlement. And the more willing party tends to receive a worse bargain.
Under this standard theory of litigation, parties generally settle their
disputes. And if they share a similar willingness to accept a suboptimal
settlement, the content of the settlement is, on average, equal to the expected
outcome at trial minus avoided litigation costs.
52
This theory of litigation has been discussed at length in both the civil and criminal litigation
literatures. For more details, see generally Frank Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101
YALE L.J. 1969, 1969–74 (1992); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 966, 968–77 (1979); George L. Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6–17 (1984); Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE. L.J. 1909, 1925–26 (1992); Yoon-Ho Alex
Lee & Daniel Klerman, Updating Priest and Klein, at 1–5 (Aug. 12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with USC Gould School of Law).
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As others have argued before, a number of facts about litigation—and
particularly criminal litigation—complicate these predictions.53 To begin
with, the parties’ trial estimates are not always accurate. For our purposes,
the most important cause of this inaccuracy is information asymmetry
between the parties—a point to which I return in the next subsection. But
even if the parties have the same information, trial estimates may still be
distorted by a range of cognitive biases.54 People are generally overconfident
about their abilities55 and the probability of their success.56 They also tend
to remember57 and interpret58 information selectively based on their opinions
and interests. One study by George Loewenstein and colleagues, for
example, randomly assigned undergraduate students to the role of plaintiff
or defendant in an imaginary tort suit.59 Although they received the same
53
See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 7, at 2465–69 (arguing that the shadow-of-trial model fails to account
for “[s]tructural forces and psychological biases” that affect criminal trials and plea bargaining, such as
“[p]oor lawyering, agency costs, lawyers’ self interest[,] . . . overconfidence, self-serving biases[,] . . .
and risk preferences.”).
54
For a review of the empirical evidence on cognitive biases and their implications for negotiations
and mediation, see Bibas, supra note 7, at 2498–2502; Russell B. Korobkin, Psychological Impediments
to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOLUTION 281, 284–94, 298–304,
308–14 (2006).
55
See, e.g., David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait
Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 324, 324 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (surveying high school students and
finding that 60% reported believing they were in the top 10% in terms of their ability to get along with
others and only 2% reported having below-average leadership skills); David Dunning et. al., Flawed SelfAssessment: Implications for Health, Education, and the Workplace, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 69, 72
(2004) (“Of college professors, 94% say they do above average work.”).
56
See Marie Helweg-Larsen & James A. Shepperd, Do Moderators of the Optimistic Bias Affect
Personal or Target Risk Estimates? A Review of the Literature, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 74,
74 (2001) (“Among the most robust findings in research on social perceptions and cognitions over the
last two decades is the optimistic bias—the tendency for people to report that they are less likely than
others to experience negative events and more likely than others to experience positive events.”). The
overconfidence bias is particularly strong where—as in the plea bargaining context—individuals have
some control over the outcome or the task is difficult. Id. at 85–88; see also Dale Griffin & Amos
Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411,
425–28 (1992) (providing empirical evidence that overconfidence bias increases across tasks of varying
mathematical difficulty).
57
See George Loewenstein et al., Self-serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22
J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 150 (1993) (reporting that students randomly assigned to serve as plaintiffs or
defendants recalled more arguments favoring their own positions).
58
See Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and
Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 176, 180–81 (1992) (reviewing
the relevant empirical literature); see also Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case
Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 130–32 (1954) (finding that, after watching a football
game, respondents who supported a particular football team reported observing fewer and less severe
violations than respondents who supported the opposite team); Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation
and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2105, 2107 (1979) (finding that supporters and opponents of the
death penalty interpret mixed evidence of its effectiveness as supporting their own position).
59
Loewenstein et al., supra note 57, at 145–46.
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information about the case and had little stake in the outcome, students
assigned to be plaintiffs predicted trial outcomes that were 59% higher than
those assigned to the role of defendants.60 Moreover, students with greater
bias were less likely to settle.61 Other empirical work has found that the
availability of more information can exacerbate bias, as more data points
create more opportunities for self-serving interpretation.62 Taken together,
these biases lead the parties to overestimate the probability of their success
at trial. In turn, the trial estimates grow further apart.
Asymmetries in the parties’ willingness to accept a suboptimal offer also
complicate predictions based on the shadow of trial. Parties in criminal cases
often have very different stakes from one another. The stakes of a nonviolent drug offender facing a twenty-year mandatory minimum, for
example, far outweigh those of the prosecution. A risk-averse defendant
may, therefore, be more willing to accept a suboptimal settlement.
Moreover, the parties in criminal cases frequently have different litigation
costs.63
Finally, predictions based on the shadow of trial are further skewed by
the limited universe of possible plea agreements.64 Plea negotiations often
focus on charge bargaining,65 but in most cases there are few possible
charges and each one carries a very different penalty. Charge bargaining thus
“leaps from one charge to another,” allowing little fine calibration.66 In turn,
parties may have difficulty finding a mutually agreeable settlement that
accurately represents the expected trial outcome.
Id. at 151 tbl.2 (indicating that, on average, defendants estimated a trial verdict of $24,426 while
plaintiffs estimated a verdict of $38,953).
61
See id. at 151. Using the same hypothetical case, a second study delayed assigning roles to a
random subset of subjects until after they had read the case file. Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments
of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337, 1338–41 (1995). The paper found no evidence of
self-serving bias for this subgroup. Id. at 1340.
62
Thompson & Loewenstein, supra note 58, at 188, 193–94 (finding that subjects in a lab
experiment reached more divergent trial estimates when given more information about the case); see also
Babcock et al., supra note 61, at 1337 (“The fact that people interpret information in a self-serving
manner means that . . . giving two parties more information may cause their expectations to diverge.”).
63
Most defendants do not pay for their own attorneys. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT., NCJ 179023, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000) (reporting that in 1996, 82%
of felony state court defendants in the largest seventy-five counties in the United States were represented
by publicly funded attorneys). Moreover, some defendants may prefer trial over a plea agreement if delay
fades witnesses’ memories or allows evidence to grow stale.
64
See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
1059, 1144–45 (1976) (stating that “accidents of ‘spacing’” in criminal codes affect the magnitude and
rationality of discounts that defendants receive in charge bargaining).
65
Parties can also bargain over sentence lengths. But the prosecutor can only recommend a sentence
to the court, and the ultimate decision is up to the judge. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 112 (2002) (“[A]ny prosecutorial agreement to
recommend a particular sentence will become known and could well provoke a veto or modification from
one of those other actors. Any concessions to the defendant at sentencing remain in the control of the
judge, who explains her decision on the public record.”).
66
Alschuler, supra note 64, at 1144.
60
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, we have little systematic evidence about the
accuracy of the shadow-of-trial theory in the criminal context. But what little
evidence we do have suggests that, despite all these complications, the
theory provides reasonably accurate predictions of prosecutors’ and defense
attorneys’ beliefs about acceptable plea agreements in particular cases.67
B. Effects of Information Asymmetry
As noted earlier, for our purposes the most important complication for
the shadow-of-trial theory is that parties’ trial estimates can be skewed by
information asymmetries regarding relevant and admissible evidence. The
precise effects of these asymmetries on the probability and severity of a plea
agreement depend on the content of the evidence.
Suppose, for example, that the prosecution has more inculpatory
evidence than the defense knows about.68 This evidence increases the
prosecution’s optimism without exerting a corresponding decrease in the
defendant’s. In turn, the distance between the parties’ trial estimates expands
and the probability of a plea agreement drops.69 Moreover, because the
defense cannot incorporate the inculpatory evidence into its trial estimate,
any plea agreement that is reached will reflect the defense’s low trial
estimate and will accordingly be less severe.
The effects of information asymmetry about exculpatory evidence are
more complicated because they depend on whether the prosecution
anticipates that the defense will or will not obtain the evidence before trial.
If the prosecutor believes that the defense will never obtain the evidence—
perhaps because she believes the requirements of Brady are not satisfied—
then the information asymmetry has no effect on the distance between the
parties’ trial estimates and thus has no effect on the probability of a plea
agreement. The defendant cannot incorporate the evidence into the trial
estimate without knowing that the evidence exists. And since the prosecution
has no incentive to introduce the exculpatory evidence at trial, the
prosecution does not incorporate the evidence into its own estimate of the
67
A recent study randomly assigned prosecutors and defense attorneys to read different
hypothetical case files that varied in quality of evidence and defendant characteristics. See Shawn D.
Bushway et al., An Explicit Test of Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of Trial,” 52 CRIMINOLOGY 723,
735–39 (2014). It then asked them to estimate the probability of conviction, the expected sentence at
trial, and the least favorable plea deal that they would be willing to accept. Id. at 725. The results for
prosecutors and defense attorneys were generally consistent with the shadow-of-trial theory. Id. at 740–
47.
68
The same basic analysis can be conducted in the reverse position with the defendant in possession
of evidence the prosecution does not know about. I focus on the prosecution because open-file statutes
impose substantially broader discovery obligations on the prosecution than the defense.
69
Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 435, 444 (1994) (“[T]rials occur when plaintiff expects a large trial judgment . . . and defendant
expects a relatively small trial judgment.”).
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trial outcome either. But if the parties settle, the settlement is on average
more severe because the defendant is unaware of the evidence.70
The effects of information asymmetry differ if the prosecution
anticipates that the defense will obtain the exculpatory evidence prior to the
close of trial, either through discovery or the defense’s investigative
efforts.71 This time, the prosecution anticipates that the defense will obtain
and present the evidence prior to the close of trial, and thus the prosecution
decreases its optimism. The information asymmetry may also increase the
prosecution’s willingness to accept a suboptimal settlement because it has a
special incentive to settle quickly before the defense obtains the evidence.72
Thus, the asymmetry increases the probability of settlement by decreasing
the distance between the parties’ trial estimates (as the defense does not
know there is more evidence in his favor) and by increasing the willingness
of the prosecution to accept a suboptimal settlement.73 If a settlement is
reached, the asymmetry likely increases the severity of the plea agreement
because the defendant’s trial estimate is unduly pessimistic. Though, this
effect may be diminished by the prosecution’s greater willingness to accept
a suboptimal settlement to avoid the need to disclose at trial.
C. Incentives for Voluntary Disclosure
As information asymmetries affect both the content and probability of
plea agreements, they incentivize the prosecution to disclose evidence
voluntarily, even in the absence of discovery requirements. But because
these incentives are weak in certain contexts, they do not lead the
prosecution to fully show its cards. I consider voluntary disclosure of
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence separately.
1. Inculpatory Evidence
Generally speaking, a prosecutor seeking an optimal plea agreement has
strong incentives to disclose inculpatory evidence in order to decrease the
optimism of the defendant’s trial estimate.74 Still, a number of conditions
stop the prosecution from disclosing all inculpatory evidence.
First, unlike in civil cases where parties often have deep pockets, high
caseloads and sharp resource constraints may limit the ability of prosecutors
to disclose everything.75 Second, the prosecution can sometimes gain an

Id.; Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 413; see also Hay, supra note 12, at 494–97.
See Hay, supra note 12, at 484–94.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Douglass, supra note 10, at 459–60; Hay, supra note 12, at 487–88.
75
See Don Stemen & Bruce Frederick, Rules, Resources, and Relationships: Contextual
Constraints on Prosecutorial Decision Making, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 39–45 (2013).
70
71
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advantage by introducing surprising new evidence at trial that was not
previously disclosed.76
Third, unlike in civil litigation where it may be plausible to assume
parties are not repeat players, prosecutors and defense attorneys often handle
hundreds of cases each year in the same jurisdiction.77 Repeat interactions
lead them to incorporate strategic considerations into their disclosure
activity. A prosecutor seeking to maximize convictions across all her cases
may not always disclose strong inculpatory evidence because, if she did,
defense attorneys could infer weakness in other cases where she does not
disclose inculpatory evidence. Thus, the prosecutor may withhold
inculpatory evidence in at least some strong cases to pool the weak and
strong together and secure convictions in a larger number of cases.78
Ex ante, it’s hard to predict the level of this pooling behavior that
optimizes the prosecution’s goals,79 but there must be a limit. In addition to
seeking convictions, prosecutors also seek efficiency. And a prosecutor that
has a reputation for making plea offers without sufficient evidence will have
trouble convincing defendants to accept them.80 As trials are incredibly time
consuming, a prosecutor seeking a large number of convictions must usually
make plea offers that are supported by the government’s evidence.
So far, I have assumed that the prosecution only has two options:
disclose a piece of evidence or not. But it may also gain an advantage from
disclosing only some information about particular evidence. It might, for
example, inform the defense that it has two eyewitnesses who can put the
defendant at the scene of the crime but withhold particular details about
exactly what they saw. Doing so helps convince the defense that the
prosecution has strong evidence without providing the opportunity to weave
an innocent story around the details of the prosecution’s case. Thus,
prosecutors may disclose inculpatory evidence differentially depending on
its level of generality.
Hay, supra note 12, at 482.
I am grateful to Daniel Richman for a fruitful conversation on this point.
78
For a valuable introductory discussion of pooling strategies, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H.
GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 122–157 (1994).
79
Scholars frequently note that “many” prosecutors open their files to defendants. Russell Covey,
Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV.
213, 234 (2007); H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent? Restrictions on Criminal
Discovery in Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1107 (1991); see also
Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 541, 593–94 (2006) (“[S]tate and county prosecutors in numerous jurisdictions have some
sort of open file policy in practice.”). But whether a defendant will be “the beneficiary of an open file
policy may depend on the particular prosecutor, the relationship between defense counsel and the
prosecutor, the identity of the defendant, and the nature of the case.” Prosser, supra at 593–94.
80
See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 136 (1997) (“Cooperative relationships based on a reputation for trustworthiness
and credibility may simply grease the wheels of a plea negotiation, making it faster and more efficient.”).
76
77
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2. Exculpatory Evidence
In some circumstances, prosecutors also have incentives to disclose
exculpatory evidence voluntarily. As Steven Shavell argues in the civil
context, litigants voluntarily disclose unfavorable evidence through a
process of natural unraveling.81 Because the defendant may infer from the
prosecutor’s silence that the government’s case is weak and thus become
more optimistic about the trial outcome, the government may voluntarily
disclose exculpatory evidence—even if it is not yet obligated to do so under
Brady—to correct the defendant’s optimism.82 Complete unraveling of
exculpatory evidence, however, is unlikely. Most importantly, the
unraveling process can’t begin if the defendant is completely unaware that
the withheld evidence exists.83
*

*

*

In summary, even in a traditional system of discovery, the prosecution
has significant incentives to disclose some inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence voluntarily. There are two key takeaways. First, preexisting
incentives for voluntary disclosure may mean that open-file statutes have a
smaller effect on prosecutorial disclosure than we anticipate. And second,
the strength of the incentives for voluntary disclosure depend on a variety of
factors, including the nature of the evidence, resource constraints, the value
of trial surprise, and pooling considerations. Expanding discovery
requirements through open-file has the biggest effect where the incentives
to disclose are weak.
III. THE EFFECTS OF OPEN-FILE ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE
To address the limitations of traditional discovery and the incomplete
incentives for voluntary disclosure, a number of states have recently adopted
rules that dramatically expand defendant discovery rights.84 A small number
of other states, including New Jersey and Florida, adopted similarly
expansive statutes beginning in the 1970s.85
As prior scholarship acknowledges, these statutes require prosecutors to
disclose far more evidence earlier in the criminal process. But this broad
Shavell, supra note 12, at 184.
See id. at 184 (“The amount these silent plaintiffs obtain in settlements reflects the inference
rationally made by defendants that silent plaintiffs are those who would obtain low expected judgments
from trial.”).
83
Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 69, at 444; see also Hay, supra note 12, at 489 (noting that a
party must first become aware that something is being concealed before drawing an adverse inference
from concealment).
84
See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
85
See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(A)–(J) (listing a wide variety of discoverable materials); FL.
ST. R. CRIM. PROC. art. 3.220(b)(1)–(4) (same).
81
82
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generalization overlooks significant interjurisdictional variation. Indeed,
expansive discovery statutes differ on several important policy dimensions,
each of which condition their effects on both the volume and timing of
prosecutorial disclosure.
86

A. Volume of Disclosure
I consider the effects of four design dimensions on the volume of
disclosure: (1) substantive scope; (2) compliance mechanisms; (3) witness
protection tools; and (4) methods of disclosure.
1. Substantive Scope
States have reshaped the substantive scope of their discovery statutes in
three primary ways. First, they have expanded the universe of discoverable
evidence. The most common approach is to insert into the statute new,
discrete categories of discoverable evidence for police reports, tangible
objects, books, documents, medical examinations, scientific tests, and the
statements of defendants, codefendants, and witnesses the prosecution
intends to present at trial.87 Some states have gone further, granting access
to statements of witnesses the prosecution does not intend to introduce,88
statements of grand jury witnesses,89 prosecution witnesses’ criminal
histories,90 investigating officers’ notes,91 crime scenes,92 information on
eyewitness identifications,93 information about promises of inducements or
rewards for state witnesses,94 and information on confidential informant
sources.95 They have also clarified that these requirements apply not only to
evidence in the prosecution’s possession, but also to evidence in the
possession of other state agencies involved in the case.96
An even more expansive approach is to require disclosure of all
materials associated with the case. Minnesota’s discovery rule guarantees
86
Scholars have given relatively little attention to variation across open-file statutes. One exception
is Mosteller, who coined the term “full open-file discovery” to distinguish discovery systems with the
broadest substantive scope, encompassing all materials in the investigative file. Mosteller, supra note 1,
at 275.
87
See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(A)–(J).
88
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(a)(1)(a) (West 2016); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 39.14(a) (West 2015).
89
See, e.g., OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(B)(1); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(1)(A)(ii).
90
See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01(1)(1)(a).
91
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A–903(a)(1)(a) (West 2016).
92
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(A)–(E)(1).
93
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(1)(A)(viii); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.52(b) (West
2016).
94
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(1)(A)(ix).
95
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1)(G).
96
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West 2015); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A903(a)(1) (West 2016); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(B).
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the defendant access to “all matters within the prosecutor’s possession or
control that relate to the case,”97 and North Carolina requires the prosecution
to disclose the “complete files of all law enforcement agencies, investigatory
agencies, and prosecutor’s offices involved in the investigation of the crimes
committed or the prosecution of the defendant.”98 This standard is frequently
interpreted to cover “everything” collected and produced, including
handwritten and electronic notes, video recordings, and even e-mails and
text messages exchanged between officers.99 If construed as broadly as in
North Carolina, requiring disclosure of all materials likely encourages the
greatest volume of disclosure.
Second, some jurisdictions have also encouraged more disclosure by
eliminating vague legal standards such as materiality.100 This prevents
prosecutors from arguing after the fact that they were not obligated to
disclose. It also strips them of their discretionary role as gatekeepers.101
Indeed, they no longer need to make difficult ex ante predictions about
whether evidence will be relevant at trial, and their biases are muted by the
presumption that everything must be disclosed.102 By reducing prosecutorial
discretion, open-file statutes can lead to disclosure of exculpatory evidence
that otherwise might have fallen through the deep cracks in Brady.103
Finally, the kinds of cases to which an open-file statute applies matters
as much as the kinds of evidence it covers. Presumably as a cost-saving
device, Minnesota limits open-file to charges punishable by more than
ninety days of jail time104 and North Carolina limits it to felonies.105 Texas,
97
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01(1); see also id. cmt. R. 9 (referring to this provision as “open-file”); State
v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Minn. 2000) (“The rules require the prosecuting attorney to allow the
defense access to ‘all matters . . . which relate to the case.’”).
98
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(a)(1) (West 2016). The statute supplements this broad
requirement with a short list of items included in the “file” but makes clear the list is not exhaustive. Id.
99
See, e.g., Robert Campbell, Discovery Techniques, Spring Pub. Def. Attorney & Investigator
Conference, at 6 (2010), http://www.ncids.org/Defender%20Training/2010%20Spring%20Conference/
AgressiveDiscoveryTechniques.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QYA-L266] (providing training to defense
attorneys on discovery practice in North Carolina); Mike Klinkosum, Getting Started: Developing an
Investigation and Discovery Plan, New Felony Def. Training, at 8–9 (Feb. 26–27, 2009),
http://www.ncids.org/Defender%20Training/2009%20New%20Felony%20Defender%20Training/Dev
elopingAnInvestigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEA2-LQHL]; see also CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG
POLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVES MANUAL (2006),
www.aele.org/law/2010all03/charlotte.html
[https://perma.cc/JQ2N-G25H] (detailing the process of recording interviews and making them available
to the prosecution).
100
See, e.g., HOOPER ET AL., supra note 45, at 16–17 (noting that some courts have eliminated the
materiality requirement by local court rule).
101
See Mosteller, supra note 1, at 310 (“The beauty of full open-file discovery is obvious as a
remedy for the difficulty of subjective choice in a competitive adversarial environment. It does not
require a prosecutor to make difficult discretionary decisions.”).
102
See supra notes 422–50 and accompanying text.
103
Id.
104
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01.
105
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 15A-901, 7A–271(a) (West 2016).

2017]

THE FRAGILE PROMISE OF OPEN-FILE DISCOVERY

791

in contrast, applies the same broad discovery rules to nearly all criminal
cases.106
2. Compliance Mechanisms
Even if evidence falls within the broad substantive scope of an open-file
statute, the government may still fail to comply with its obligation to
disclose. Open-file statutes may therefore increase the volume of
prosecutorial disclosure by imposing compliance mechanisms on police,
prosecutors, and other government employees.
First, some states have adopted procedural devices to diminish the
chance that discoverable evidence falls through the cracks due to good-faith
mistakes or negligence. In Massachusetts, for example, after the parties
disclose all discovery materials, they must submit a “certificate of
compliance” stating that “to the best of [their] knowledge and after
reasonable inquiry, the[y] ha[ve] disclosed” all necessary materials.107 Some
jurisdictions also require the parties to specifically enumerate every item
disclosed.108 This enables the receiving party to verify receipt and also serves
as a comprehensive list to help adjudicate claims of discovery violations
later on.
Second, the government can sometimes skirt its disclosure
responsibilities by exploiting the institutional cracks between multiple
agencies involved in an investigation. Police officers, for example, may
avoid disclosure of specific materials by failing to transfer them to the
prosecution.109 North Carolina thus requires police to “make available to the
prosecutor’s office a complete copy of the complete files related to the
investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the
defendant.”110
Government agencies can also circumvent broad discovery
requirements by failing to collect or record evidence. Some open-file statutes
impose collection and recording obligations on investigative agencies for
certain evidence and information. North Carolina requires police officers to
record or reduce to writing the oral statements of witnesses,111 and a number

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2015).
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(3).
108
Id.; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(i) (West 2015).
109
See Medwed, supra note 6, at 1564–65 (“Even when the police record exculpatory information
that material might not be made available to the prosecution. Before its practices were exposed in the late
1980s, the Chicago Police Department employed a double-file system. Detectives kept two sets of books:
official files and shadow ‘street files.’ Absent from the former, which were turned over to the prosecution,
were any number of exculpatory items dutifully recorded and retained in the latter.”).
110
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(c) (West 2016).
111
State v. Shannon, 642 S.E.2d 516, 525 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 15A-903(a)(1) (West 2016) (requiring disclosure of the “complete files of all law enforcement
agencies” and that “[o]ral statements shall be in written or recorded form”).
106
107
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of jurisdictions require the police to record interrogations or eyewitness
identifications.113
Third, because discovery violations are rarely detected and sanctions are
rarely imposed, government officials have weak personal incentives to
comply with discovery rules.114 States can increase these incentives with
criminal sanctions. In 2011, North Carolina amended its open-file statute to
enact a felony prohibition against “willfully omit[ing] or misrepresent[ing]
evidence or information required to be disclosed” under the statute.115
Prosecutions under these statutes are no doubt rare, but the threat of prison
could deter some intentional misconduct. A criminal sanction could also
promote cultural change by communicating to new police officers and
prosecutors how seriously the government takes discovery.
Fourth, prosecutors can circumvent even the most expansive substantive
discovery requirements by making exploding plea offers that expire before
the right to discovery attaches. In response, some states have adopted
procedural devices to protect defendants from these coercive practices. In
New Jersey, if the prosecution makes a plea offer before indictment, it must
disclose at the time of the offer nearly everything that would be discoverable
thereafter.116 Arizona takes a narrower approach, expediting discovery rights
only in cases where the prosecution attaches a deadline to a plea offer.117 In
those cases, the prosecution must satisfy its discovery duties at least thirty
days before the deadline.118 Regardless of whether the defendant accepts or
rejects the offer, if the prosecution fails to meet this requirement and the
court determines that the discovery violation “materially impacted the
defendant’s decision,” the prosecutor must reinstate the lapsed plea offer or
else the undisclosed evidence is presumptively barred at trial.119
Of course, none of these compliance mechanisms can ensure that the
government always satisfies its discovery obligations. But, on the margins,
they may increase compliance and thus also increase the volume of
disclosure in some cases.
112

112
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A–211(d) (West 2016); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22(3)
(West 2015); N.J. CT. R. 3:17.
113
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.52(b)(15) (West 2016); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(1)(A)(viii).
114
See supra notes 424–46 and accompanying text.
115
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A–903(d) (West 2016).
116
N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(a).
117
ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.8(a).
118
Id.
119
ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.8(c).
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3. Witness Protection
Open-file statutes are designed to give defendants broad access to
investigative files, but they must also take seriously the need to protect the
safety of witnesses.120 The precise balance struck between these competing
values can influence the volume of disclosure. States have adopted a number
of statutory mechanisms in an attempt to strike the optimal balance.
First, some states have limited how the defendant can access the
materials. Unlike in North Carolina and Ohio, which do not appear to restrict
the rights of counsel or defendant to review and possess the file,121 Texas
has adopted a two-tiered system in which counsel receives possession of the
file and “may allow a defendant . . . to view the information” but “may not
allow that person to have copies.”122 Defense counsel must also “redact” any
identifying information from the documents that the defendant reviews.123
Some states only require this two-tiered access for specified categories of
the most sensitive evidence.124 Others, like Ohio, empower prosecutors to
stamp specific materials as “counsel only.”125 Defense counsel can “orally
communicate the content” of stamped material to the defendant but cannot
“show[]” it to them directly.126
Second, in order to protect witnesses, some states have also carved out
certain categories of evidence that would otherwise be discoverable. These
categories include witness impact statements, the identity of confidential
informants, and the identity of citizens who report the crime through
organizations that guarantee anonymity.127
Third, broad discovery statutes also include procedural devices that
allow the government to withhold specific evidence that otherwise must be
disclosed. The most common approach is the protective order. In North
Carolina and New Jersey, for example, the party seeking a protective order
must file a motion, which can be ex parte, requesting to withhold otherwise

120
See, e.g., N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 9, at 81–85 (objecting to a proposal for New York
to expand its discovery statute due to inadequate protections for state witnesses).
121
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(a)(1)(d) (West 2016) (“The defendant shall have the right to
inspect and copy or photograph any materials [in the file] . . . .”); see also Grove, supra note 13, at 153
(discussing the relevant provision in Ohio).
122
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(f) (West 2015).
123
Id.
124
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(E) (allowing defense counsel, but not the defendant, to review the
photographs and results of medical examinations in sexual assault cases); see N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N,
supra note 9, at 18–19 (recommending a two-tiered system for the names and contact information of
prosecution witnesses).
125
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(C); Grove, supra note 13, at 153.
126
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(C).
127
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-904(a1)–(a4) (West 2016).
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discoverable evidence. The court may grant the motion after a “finding of
good cause.”129
A less common alternative to protective orders is certification. In some
states, the prosecution can avoid discovery requirements by certifying that it
has concerns related to witness safety, economic harm, or interference with
other ongoing criminal investigations.130 At the time of certification, the
prosecution need not “disclose the contents or meaning” of the withheld
evidence.131 The key difference between a protective order and certification
is that the latter is not subject to judicial review until late in the criminal
process. In Ohio, for example, the court must review the certification “seven
days prior to trial” under the deferential standard of review of “abuse of
discretion.”132 As between the protective order and certification procedure,
the latter appears more vulnerable to prosecutorial gamesmanship.
Prosecutors can withhold evidence without providing justification until the
eve of trial, long after a defendant decides whether to accept a plea offer.
128

4. Method of Disclosure
Open-file statutes can also influence the volume of disclosure to which
the defense has access by changing the method of disclosure. Under the most
restrictive discovery policies in the country, the defense is entitled to review
the case file in the prosecutor’s office but not to make copies or
photographs.133 It is highly burdensome to take down by hand every
potentially significant fact in the record. Open-file statutes allow the defense
to make copies at its own expense.134 While less burdensome, this
arrangement nonetheless requires defense counsel to travel to the
prosecutor’s office, review the files during working hours, and photocopy
key individual records. To smooth out this cumbersome process, many
prosecutors in these jurisdictions generate photocopies of the entire file for
the defense. Others produce and provide electronic copies via CD or the
internet.135 At least one state affirmatively requires the prosecution to
generate copies for the defense, thus shifting disclosure costs to the

Id. § 15A-908(a); N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(e)(1).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-908(a) (West 2016); N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(e)(1).
130
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(D).
131
Id. at Staff Notes (2010).
132
Id. at 16(F).
133
Some prosecutor’s offices in jurisdictions with this rule have affirmatively prohibited defense
attorneys from photocopying any materials. See TEX. DEF. SERV., supra note 9, at 19.
134
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(a)(1)(d) (West 2016); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 39.14(a) (West 2015); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(B).
135
See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and Plea Bargaining: What’s Discovery Got to Do with It?, 23
CRIM. JUST. 28, 33 (2008) (“In other[] [prosecutor’s offices], including offices in Dade County, Florida,
defense attorneys are provided, at minimal cost, a CD-ROM containing these materials. A few but
growing number of prosecutors provide the information via e-mail through PDF files.”).
128
129
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prosecution. This makes a substantial difference for overworked defense
attorneys who can save a trip to the prosecutor’s office and review discovery
on their own time.
136

B. Timing of Disclosure
In addition to expanding the volume of disclosure, open-file statutes can
also speed up its timing. The precise timing requirements vary. Some
statutes require disclosure on “a timely basis”137 or “as soon as
practicable.”138 In response, local police regulations and court rules often
create more specific deadlines. In North Carolina, many departments require
officers to submit an initial package to the prosecutor’s office between three
and thirty days after arrest.139 And local court rules may require prosecutors
to transfer discovery to the defense within three or four weeks of indictment
or the defense’s request.140
A few discovery statutes provide stronger temporal protections by
requiring disclosure at a specified time in the criminal process. New Jersey’s
discovery statute, for example, requires the prosecution to disclose “upon
N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(a)–(b).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(c) (West 2016).
138
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West 2015).
139
See e.g., DURHAM POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER NO. 4070 R-4, DISTRICT ATTORNEY
SCREENING PACKAGE 726 (last revised Nov. 30, 2011), https://durhamnc.gov/DocumentCenter/View/9
671 [https://perma.cc/P9Y9-9ZAZ] (three days); GREENVILLE POLICE DEP’T, POLICY AND PROCEDURES
MANUAL § 42.1.5 (last revised Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.greenvillenc.gov/home/showdocument?id=
10344 [https://perma.cc/VVA6-PLPG] (four days); CHAPEL HILL POLICE DEP’T, STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES § 200.1, http://www.townofchapelhill.org/home/showdocument?id=28621 [https://perma.
cc/Q5TH-75UD] (seven days); TWENTY-SIXTH PROSECUTORIAL/JUDICIAL DIST. MECKLENBURG CTY.,
CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ADOPTING CRIMINAL RULES R. 4.2 (July 9,
2010), http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Policies/LocalRules/Documents/1168.pdf [http://web.arch
ive.org/web/20160128112554/http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Policies/LocalRules/Documents/1
168.pdf] (seven days); CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG POLICE DEP’T, INTERACTIVE DIRECTIVES GUIDE §
900-013 (Jul. 21, 2014), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2661081/Charlotte-PoliceDepartment-Directives-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2KR-Q2TC] (fourteen days); FAYETTEVILLE
POLICE DEP’T, WRITTEN DIRECTIVES AND OPERATING PROCEDURES § 5.6.2(F) (Oct. 15, 2015), https:/
/www.bwcscorecard.org/static/policies/2015-12-18%20Fayetteville%20-%20BWC%20Policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BPA4-6Z8T] (thirty days).
140
See, e.g., N.C. DIST. 5 R. CRIM. P. 3.2, http://nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Policies/LocalRules/Do
cuments/438.pdf [https://perma.cc/R73E-KVAR]; N.C. DIST. 9 R. CRIM. P. 3.2, http://www.nccourts.or
g/Courts/CRS/Policies/LocalRules/Documents/379.pdf [https://perma.cc/K45S-9A2B]; N.C. DIST. 11A
R. CRIM. P. 3.2, http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Policies/LocalRules/Documents/127.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5LFL-2RP2]; N.C. DIST. 16B R. CRIM. P. 16(e)(1), http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/
CRS/Policies/LocalRules/Documents/157.pdf [https://perma.cc/72BZ-9KXH]; N.C. DIST. 27B R. CRIM.
P. 3.1, http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Policies/LocalRules/Documents/1700.pdf [https://perma.c
c/Q49V-G38T]. Others require disclosure ten or fourteen days before an administrative setting—an early
proceeding that takes place before the defendant enters a plea. N.C. DIST. 9 R. CRIM. P. 3.2,
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Policies/LocalRules/Documents/379.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CNV9CAR]; N.C. DIST. 15B R. CRIM. P. 5.2, http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Policies/LocalRules/Do
cuments/1068.pdf [https://perma.cc/WR52-DKND].
136
137

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

796

[Vol. 49:771

the return or unsealing of the indictment.”
This gives the greatest
protection for defendants because it leaves little discretion up to local
policymakers.
* * *
As this discussion has revealed, the decision to go open-file is not a
binary one. Indeed, policymakers must choose from a wide array of policy
options, each of which may affect both the volume and timing of disclosure.
Certain statutes—those that delineate a broader substantive scope and
specific timing requirements, that establish stronger compliance
mechanisms to ensure that the government fulfills its disclosure duties, that
impose fewer disclosure costs on the defense, and that require immediate
judicial oversight when prosecutors elect to withhold discoverable
evidence—produce more informative discovery packages earlier in the
criminal process.
141

IV. THE EFFECTS OF EXPANDED PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE
I next examine how changing the volume and timing of disclosure
influences the behavior of actors in other phases of the criminal process. In
doing so, I develop three primary claims. First, there are good reasons to
believe the conventional wisdom that open-file helps “level” the playing
field in both plea bargaining and trial,142 but the effects may not be as big as
we hope due to other systematic features of the criminal justice system.
Second, contrary to the predictions of scholars and policy advocates,143 a
dynamic theoretical account of plea bargaining shows that open-file may not
reduce the trial rate or speed up pleas. And third, the arms of open-file
discovery are longer than prior scholarship has appreciated. Open-file may
reach both backward and forward in time, reshaping stages in the criminal
process other than plea bargaining and trial.
To develop these claims, I move chronologically through each stage of
the criminal process, examining the effect of increased disclosure on police
investigations, charging, plea bargaining, defense litigation strategy, and
sentencing. At the end, I also consider how resource constraints on public
defense interact with each of the hypothesized effects.
A. Criminal Investigations
Prior scholarship on criminal discovery has given little consideration to
the possibility that changing disclosure practices could reshape incentives in
criminal investigations. To understand the relationship between disclosure
and investigations, it is useful to begin by examining the government’s
incentives in a world where the probability of disclosure is zero. Under these
N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(b).
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
143
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
141
142
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conditions, subject to resource and legal constraints, police officers and
prosecutors seek to maximize inculpatory evidence against suspects they
believe are guilty in order to maximize the probability of conviction.
To obtain inculpatory evidence, the government must investigate the
crime. While investigative activities may also generate exculpatory
evidence, this possibility has little effect on the incentives of police officers
and prosecutors in a world without disclosure. They are not obliged to record
evidence. And any evidence they do record can be removed from the
investigative file before its transfer to the defense. In short, absent
disclosure, finding exculpatory evidence imposes few costs on the
government in terms of reducing the probability of conviction.
But as the probability of disclosure to the defense increases—due to
voluntary disclosure, Brady, or statutory requirements—then finding
exculpatory evidence becomes increasingly costly to the government. As a
result, if police and prosecutors can predict the probability that investigative
activities produce exculpatory evidence, they may be less likely to engage
in those activities that are likely to produce it. And, if they find exculpatory
evidence, they may be less likely to record, collect, or insert it into the file.144
Two implications follow. First, if open-file substantially increases the
probability that exculpatory evidence is disclosed,145 less exculpatory
evidence may find its way into the investigative file. Strategic behavior by
police and prosecutors might therefore diminish the positive effects of
liberal discovery.
Second, in a world with broad discovery, less inculpatory evidence may
find its way into the investigative file. Investigative activity with a high
probability of yielding exculpatory evidence also has some non-zero
probability of yielding inculpatory evidence. So, if the government refrains
from such activities, it may also obtain less inculpatory evidence. The
normative implications of this result are less clear. On the one hand, less
inculpatory evidence hinders convictions. On the other, the prosecution
would tend to lose inculpatory evidence in cases where there is a higher
probability of undetected exculpatory evidence.
144
See Medwed, supra note 6, at 1564 (“Still, these reforms may not stymie one of the worst threats
to the success of open file discovery, which is not the reluctance of the police to turn over exculpatory
evidence to the prosecution, but their propensity never to record such information at all.”); see also
Stanley Z. Fisher, “Just the Facts, Ma’am”: Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police
Reports, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 30 (1993) (reviewing social science research on police deception and
omission in reports and noting that “researchers have found that some police believe that detailed reports
will, through defense discovery, ‘facilitate the impeachment of prosecution witnesses, frequently
policemen,’ and that police should therefore communicate details orally to prosecutors” (citations
omitted)); id. at 31 (reporting that a writing instructor for police stated that “while ‘of course we have to
document anything that is exculpatory,’ knowledge of the fact that defense attorneys will read the report
definitely ‘affects the way the report is written’” (citation omitted)).
145
There are many reasons why exculpatory evidence might not be disclosed under traditional
systems of discovery, including the fact that in many jurisdictions Brady only applies to the few cases
that go to trial. See supra notes 35–62 and accompanying text.
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B. Prosecutorial Charging
Prior scholarship has also given little consideration to the interaction
between expanded discovery and prosecutorial charging. Open-file could
affect charging decisions in at least two ways. First, implementing open-file
discovery is costly for prosecutor’s offices, which may already be operating
under tight budgets. Due to limited resources, a prosecutor’s office may file
charges in fewer cases. The normative implications of this result are unclear.
Fewer prosecutions mean fewer convictions of law-breakers, but they also
mean fewer false convictions. Efforts to conserve resources may also
incentivize another change in charging practices: if open-file only applies to
specific categories of offenses, prosecutors may file different charges against
defendants to avoid their discovery duties. In North Carolina, for example,
prosecutors might file misdemeanors instead of felonies to avoid open-file
obligations, which only apply to the latter.146
Second, open-file could change prosecutorial incentives to overcharge.
On the one hand, open-file might discourage overcharging by reducing the
effectiveness of the practice for securing guilty pleas.147 Indeed, defendants
armed with all of the prosecution’s evidence can better predict the risk of
conviction at trial. Open-file may, therefore, embolden defendants to refuse
plea offers in cases with overcharged indictments. Alternatively, in some
jurisdictions open-file might encourage prosecutors to overcharge in order
to induce quick guilty pleas before discovery must be provided.
C. Plea Bargaining
I next turn to plea bargaining and consider the effect of increased
disclosure on the content, probability, and timing of settlement.
1. Content and Probability of Settlement
The conventional wisdom is that open-file reduces the trial rate.148 This
is no doubt true in some cases. Indeed, greater disclosure of inculpatory
evidence in cases where the defendant otherwise underestimates the
prosecution’s evidence will reduce the defendant’s optimism and thus bring
the parties’ trial estimates closer together. But there are some reasons to
expect that open-file may not reduce the trial rate. I consider them separately
for inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.

146
See Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 755, 805–06 (2016)
(arguing that differential procedural costs across charge categories can incentivize prosecutors to engage
in strategic undercharging).
147
See R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 18 (2005) (explaining that so long as a
charge is supported by probable cause, prosecutors may engage in the practice of “overcharging” a
defendant with a more serious offense with the hope that the defendant will plead guilty to a lesser
charge).
148
Supra note 9.
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a. Inculpatory Evidence
In many cases, increased disclosure of inculpatory evidence has little
effect. When, for example, defendants accurately estimate that the
prosecution has strong evidence or, alternatively, that the prosecution has
weak evidence, then disclosure is unlikely to affect the defendant’s trial
estimate.
But in other cases, open-file can affect the defendants’ trial estimates
through two pathways. First, it can increase prosecutorial disclosure, thus
informing the defense about what evidence the prosecution has. And second,
assuming prosecutorial compliance, open-file also enables the defense to
draw negative inferences about what evidence the prosecution does not have.
The first pathway—disclosure itself—only affects the defendant’s trial
estimate if the prosecution’s inculpatory evidence is strong and the
defendant had perceived it to be weak. Disclosure decreases the defendant’s
optimism, causing the parties’ estimates to converge, and thus increases the
chance of settlement. This decrease in optimism also leads defendants to
accept more severe plea agreements.
By contrast, where the prosecution’s evidence is weak, and the defense
perceives it to be strong, disclosure alone has little effect on the defendant’s
trial estimate. The fact that the prosecution has shared some weak
inculpatory evidence does not necessarily mean it has no other evidence. To
extract more information, the defendant must be able to infer from the
prosecution’s silence that there is no other evidence. Discovery makes this
negative inference possible through the second causal pathway: assuming
prosecutorial compliance, the defendant can conclude that the prosecution
has no more discoverable evidence. Thus, where the prosecution’s
inculpatory evidence is weak but the defense perceives that evidence to be
strong, discovery increases the defendant’s optimism. As a result, it leads to
less severe plea agreements. And it increases the trial rate as the parties’
estimates diverge.149 In sum, the aggregate effect of discovery rules on the
mean of defendants’ trial estimates depends on the unknown relative
distribution of cases where the defense overestimates or underestimates the
strength of the prosecution’s inculpatory evidence.
b. Exculpatory Evidence.
While much of the analysis of inculpatory evidence applies to
exculpatory evidence too (in reverse), there is at least one important wrinkle.
Open-file primarily expedites discovery of inculpatory evidence. Indeed, all
defendants are, in some sense, entitled to disclosure of inculpatory evidence

149
Unlike the defendant’s trial estimate, which becomes more optimistic as a result of the
disclosure, the prosecution’s estimate does not change because it had already accounted for the evidence.
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due to their constitutional right to trial, which requires the prosecution to
introduce evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt before a jury.
Discovery is more complicated for exculpatory evidence. There, open-file
can not only expedite discovery—by, for example, requiring earlier
disclosure of Brady material151—but can also increase the total amount of
discovery—by, for example, requiring disclosure of exculpatory evidence
even if the prosecution perceives it fails Brady. The effects of discovery
depend, then, on whether the disclosure is expedited or increased.
Starting with expedited disclosure, if the prosecution has strong
exculpatory evidence and the defendant is unaware, expedited disclosure
decreases the probability of settlement and decreases the severity of
settlements on average for two reasons. First, expedited disclosure increases
the optimism of the defendant’s trial estimate but has no effect on that of the
prosecutor, who was aware that the evidence would be discoverable at trial
under Brady and thus had already accounted for it. As a result, the parties’
estimates diverge. And the divergence is enhanced by psychological biases
that skew the parties’ interpretation of the evidence.152 Second, requiring
expedited disclosure decreases the prosecutor’s willingness to accept a
suboptimal settlement because she no longer has a special incentive to
dispose of the case early to avoid disclosure under Brady, which would
likely require disclosure at trial.153 Taken together, expedited disclosure
decreases the probability of settlement by increasing the distance between
the parties’ trial estimates and decreasing the prosecution’s willingness to
accept a suboptimal settlement. It also decreases the severity of plea
agreements on average by encouraging the defendant’s optimism.
The size of these effects differ when open-file increases rather than
expedites disclosure of exculpatory evidence. Increased disclosure has a
smaller negative effect on the probability of settlement because, in this
context, the prosecutor never had a special incentive to secure an early guilty
plea to avoid disclosure at trial under Brady. On the other hand, increased
disclosure has a larger positive effect on the severity of plea agreements.
That’s because it not only increases the optimism of the defendant’s trial
estimate, but also diminishes the optimism of the prosecutor, who previously
ignored the evidence while estimating the outcome of trial because it was
not discoverable.
What about cases where the prosecution has little exculpatory evidence
150

They also have a right to see some inculpatory evidence at a preliminary hearing, though, in
practice that right is frequently waived.
151
See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(4) (“As soon as practicable after the filing of the charging
document the prosecutor shall disclose any material information that tends to negate the guilt of the
defendant . . . .”). This change is particularly important for Brady witness statements, which under the
discovery statutes in some states, including North Carolina and Texas prior to their recent discovery
reforms, were sometimes withheld until after the witness testified.
152
See infra notes 154–62 and accompanying text.
153
See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
150

2017]

THE FRAGILE PROMISE OF OPEN-FILE DISCOVERY

801

but the defendant perceives it has strong exculpatory evidence? Assuming
prosecutorial compliance with the discovery rules, the defendant draws a
negative inference from the absence of exculpatory evidence in the
discovery package. The defendant’s trial estimate, thus, becomes less
optimistic. As a result, both the probability and severity of settlements
increase.
Given all this complexity, what can we say about the effect of open-file
on the content and probability of plea agreements? The causal arrows are
pointing in different directions. In cases where the defense underestimates
the prosecution’s exculpatory evidence, open-file increases the defendant’s
optimism and thus decreases trials and produces less severe settlements. The
precise size of the effects depends on whether open-file has increased the
amount of exculpatory evidence disclosed, or has merely expedited
disclosure. On the other hand, in cases where the defense overestimates the
prosecution’s exculpatory evidence, open-file makes the defendant less
optimistic and thus decreases trials and increases the severity of settlements.
Ex ante, it’s hard to say which of these effects is stronger, particularly given
that we do not know the relative distribution of overestimating and
underestimating defendants. But all of these considerations give reason to
question the conventional wisdom that open-file decreases the trial rate.
2. Timing of Settlement
The conventional wisdom that open-file speeds up dispositions is based
on several observations. First, in some cases the content of a discovery
package may be the direct cause of settlement. Early and expeditious
disclosure would presumably mean earlier settlement. Second, even if a
defendant is generally aware of the government’s evidence, it may be easier
to persuade clients to accept fair plea agreements when they have the
evidence in their own hands.154 Third, a defense attorney who receives
discovery early in the criminal process has less need to engage in timeconsuming investigative work: she can go straight to the witnesses already
disclosed by the government without needing to identify them first.155
Fourth, defense attorneys often need to jump through hoops—like filing and
litigating discovery motions—to obtain evidence from unwilling
prosecutors in jurisdictions with narrow pretrial discovery statutes. Broader
pretrial discovery rights can help avoid these costs.
On the other hand, a number of considerations suggest pretrial discovery
may slow down some plea agreements too. First, as a discovery package
contains more useful material, a defendant is less likely to settle before
receiving it. Second, preparing discovery is time consuming and
LEGAL AID SOC’Y, supra note 9, at 30.
See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY 19 (2014) (“[T]he defense
lawyer in many cases is unable to investigate or to develop defenses until he or she is provided with
addresses or contact information for finding and/or investigating the witnesses.”).
154
155
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burdensome—particularly for broad open-file statutes—and it may take
months for police and prosecutors to gather, compile, and transfer evidence
to the defense in compliance with the statute. Third, in recent years, broad
discovery statutes and the digitalization of discovery records have together
created a deluge of information that is challenging to review.156 One attorney
in North Carolina described to me an extreme case where discovery included
10,000 text messages exchanged by police officers during the course of an
investigation. Finally, while broad pretrial discovery statutes can decrease
litigation about whether a defendant has a right to discovery of specific
evidence, some attorneys in North Carolina reported to me that open-file has
fueled a surge in litigation about whether the government has satisfied its
discovery obligations. One prosecutor claimed that in many cases, he spends
more time litigating whether the prosecution has adequately disclosed than
litigating the merits of the case.
On balance, discovery requirements may speed up the timing of guilty
pleas, but it is far from clear, and the effects likely vary based on the
specifics of the statute.
D. Pre-Trial Defense Strategy
Prior scholarship has emphasized that open-file discovery promotes
more robust litigation of substantive criminal law claims.157 But it could
impact defense litigation strategy in other unanticipated ways too. It could,
for example, stimulate more vigorous enforcement of the Fourth
Amendment. Open-file provides defense attorneys more information earlier
in the process about evidence the government has seized. Where the
defendant does not know the government has obtained the evidence and this
fact cannot be inferred from the complaint, discovery fills the gap.
Disclosure of arrest reports, investigator notes, and recorded police
communications also provide information about the process by which
evidence was seized—information the defendant may not know, remember,
156
See Randall Sims & R. Marc Ranc, Two Views of Morton, 77 TEX. B.J. 964, 966 (2014)
(describing open-file discovery as a “double-edged sword” because there is “[s]o much information even
in what we may consider the simplest of cases” such as DWI cases, which generate extensive video
evidence); JEFFREY ROSEN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE CONVERSATIONS PODCAST WITH DAVID ONEK, EPISODE
#24
10–11
(2011),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/CrimJusPod_Episode24_(final).pdf
[https://perma.cc/2FH9-MTX3] (“[T]he amount of discovery that is available in criminal cases [has]
really exploded in the last 15 or 20 years and the reason for that is, when I started as a prosecutor in 1995,
there were police reports and photos. Now, many statements are audio- and videotaped, which creates
additional amounts of discovery. The number of photos that are taken at crime scenes are well into the
hundreds and, sometimes, thousands and, once statements are taken, transcripts are done of those
statements. This creates thousands and thousands of more pages and so just the sheer volume of discovery
is enormous.”).
157
See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 6, at 1559 (“The most obvious benefit of open file discovery [is]
reducing the rate of wrongful convictions . . . .”); McMunigal, supra note 6, at 967–72 (arguing increased
disclosure of evidence improves the accuracy of plea agreements).
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or appreciate as legally significant. Thus, by informing the defense both of
the universe of seized items and the process by which they were obtained,
open-file may help defense attorneys generate more suppression claims.
Increased enforcement of the Fourth Amendment is a good thing. It’s
worth noting, however, that the legislative goals of discovery reform are less
about enforcement of procedural rights and more about stimulating litigation
of substantive criminal law. And the two might be in tension. Due to
inadequate indigent defense budgets, many attorneys can devote only
limited time to their clients and can only raise a limited number of claims on
their behalf.158 In turn, they are pressured to adopt a litigation strategy across
their docket that achieves the best results for all their clients with the fewest
resources.159 Bill Stuntz argued that public defenders are thus encouraged to
raise procedural claims through motions to suppress rather than claims of
substantive criminal law—the former being much cheaper to investigate and
litigate and, in many cases, similarly effective at securing dismissals.160 If
that’s right, then the availability of cheaper suppression strategies could
displace efforts to litigate claims about substantive criminal law, which are
more central to the legislative goals of discovery reform.
E. Sentencing
Of course, open-file decreases sentences in cases where it enables
defendants to obtain more dismissals, lenient plea agreements, or acquittals.
But it can affect sentencing in other more complex ways too—by modifying
the costs of litigation and thus by changing the plea-trial differential.
Significant anecdotal and quantitative evidence suggests that defendants
who plead guilty receive more lenient sentences than similarly situated
defendants who go to trial.161 Some view this difference as a plea discount—
the prosecutor seeks to reward defendants who plead guilty as compensation
for waiving their constitutional rights and saving the prosecution and court
further litigation costs.162 Most scholars, however, view it as a trial penalty—
Stuntz, supra note 20, at 39–40.
Id.
160
Id.
161
See, e.g., Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After
Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 973–75
(2005) (examining the differences in sentences between cases disposed by trial and guilty plea).
162
See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1398 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court
today embraces the sporting-chance theory of criminal law, in which the State functions like a
conscientious casino-operator, giving each player a fair chance to beat the house, that is, to serve less
time than the law says he deserves. And when a player is excluded from the tables, his constitutional
rights have been violated. I do not subscribe to that theory.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure
as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL. STUD. 289, 309 (1983) (“The defendant, who buys the plea, pays by
surrendering his right to impose costs on the prosecutor by demanding trial and by surrendering his
chance of acquittal at trial.”); Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 599, 617
158
159
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the prosecutor seeks to punish defendants who exercise their right to trial by
seeking higher sentences.163
Whether the plea-trial differential represents a penalty or discount
influences the effect of open-file on sentencing. Under the discount theory,
a defendant who pleads guilty early in the process, before discovery is
provided, should receive a bigger discount after the enactment of open-file
because his plea saves the prosecution more resources. In contrast, under the
penalty theory, that same defendant would experience no change in sentence
because the enactment of open-file does not change the costs the prosecution
would be forced to expend in securing the early guilty plea.
At least two implications follow. The first is that one defendant’s right
to discovery is another’s right to exchange it for lenience. Thus, particularly
if the plea-trial differential represents a plea discount, open-file could help
guilty defendants obtain more lenient sentences simply by giving them a
valuable bargaining chip to trade away.
The second implication is a methodological one to which I return
later.164 It is no exaggeration to say that huge normative implications ride on
whether plea-trial differentials represent discounts or penalties. If the
former, then plea bargaining merely expands the range of choices available
to defendants and is not coercive.165 If, on the other hand, the penalty theory
is correct, then plea bargaining is a deeply troubling and coercive practice
that punishes defendants for exercising their legal rights.166
Despite the importance of this empirical question, the scholarly
literature offers little guidance on whether plea discounts or trial penalties
better explain the plea-trial differential. Indeed, many voices in the
theoretical literature question whether there is any conceptual distinction
(2005) (“[P]arties commonly strike deals in part because of the anticipated costs of the trial that a guilty
plea would obviate.”).
163
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering Wound,
51 DUQ. L. REV. 673, 685–86 (2013) (“If post-trial sentences are unjust and are imposed simply for the
purpose of inducing guilty pleas (as the Supreme Court recognizes five-to-four), plea bargaining surely
merits criticism. This process then benefits both parties only in the sense that a gunman’s demand for
your money or your life benefits you as well as the gunman.”); Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the PleaBargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011)
(“The expected post-trial sentence is imposed in only a few percent of cases. It is like the sticker price
for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view full price as the norm and anything less as a
bargain.”); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 47 (1983) (“[O]ne can conclude that in most cases the prosecutor
unilaterally determines what concessions the defendant will receive for his guilty plea because of the
state’s ability to punish those defendants who do not plead.”); John H. Langbein, Land
Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204, 213 (1979) (“[T]hat terrible
attribute that defines our plea bargaining and makes it coercive and unjust: the sentencing differential by
which the accused is threatened with an increased sanction for conviction after trial by comparison with
that which is offered for confession and waiver of trial.”).
164
See infra notes 243–49 and accompanying text.
165
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 52, at 1963.
166
Id.
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between discounts and penalties at all in this context. And despite the
efforts of scholars,168 we cannot infer the trial penalty theory from empirical
evidence of the mere existence of a plea-trial differential—in a world of
static litigation costs, both the penalty and discount theories fit observed
reality equally well.
Fortunately, we do not live in a static world. As the foregoing theoretical
analysis reveals, open-file changes the distribution of litigation costs at
different phases of the criminal process. In future work, empirical scholars
could try to test the plea discount and trial penalty theories by examining the
theoretical predictions laid out above.
167

F. Limits of Indigent Defense Resources
The sizes of the effects identified in the previous subsections depend, at
least in part, on whether and how defense attorneys use discovery. Defense
attorneys cannot secure better plea agreements for their clients unless they
have the time and resources to use the discovery package properly. And if
they don’t, then police are unlikely to change their investigative practices,
prosecutors are unlikely to change their charging practices, and courts are
167
See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 659
(1981) (“If the concepts of reward and penalty are relative—if the concepts derive their meaning only
from each other—the assertion that some defendants are rewarded [by plea bargaining] and none
penalized is simply schizophrenic.”); John C. Coffee Jr., ‘Twisting Slowly in the Wind’: A Search for
Constitutional Limits on Coercion of the Criminal Defendant, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 211, 251 (“The
defendant facing the plea/trial decision is facing an essentially either/or decision, and in this binary
context, the credit and a penalty are too reciprocally related to pretend that crediting one who pleads
guilty is not equivalent to penalizing him for going to trial.”); Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming
Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1243 n.27 (2008) (“Plea discounts and
trial penalties are simply two sides of the same coin, a logical conclusion many courts have reluctantly
reached.”); Howe, supra note 162, at 625 (“Critics assert . . . that a reward for abandoning trial can only
sensibly be understood as a penalty for going to trial.”); Note, Influence of Defendant’s Plea on Judicial
Determination of Sentences, 66 YALE. L.J. 204, 220 (1956) (“An accused who receives a harsher
punishment than the court would have decreed had he waived a costly and time-consuming trial pays a
judicially imposed penalty for exercising constitutionally guaranteed rights. Nor can such an objection
be overcome by the rationale that judges, rather than penalizing defendants convicted at trial, instead
reward those who plead guilty. This distinction is illusory; the fact is that, whether by means of forfeiting
a reward or incurring a penalty, a demand for trial will result in a more severe punishment than would be
imposed following a guilty plea.”) (footnote omitted); see also Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 278
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (“[I]n reality there are winners and losers. The ‘normal’ sentence is the average sentence
for all defendants, those who plead guilty and those who plead innocent. If we are ‘lenient’ toward the
former, we are by precisely the same token ‘more severe’ toward the latter.”); State v. Burgess, 943 A.2d
727, 737 (N.H. 2008) (“[W]e doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between ‘enhancing’ the
punishment imposed upon the [defendant] and denying him the ‘leniency’ he claims would be appropriate
if he had expressed remorse, since, ultimately, the result is the same: a sentence within the statutory limits
for the specified crime.” (citation omitted)); Coles v. United States, 682 A.2d 167, 169 (D.C. 1996) (“The
line between affording leniency to a defendant who has admitted guilt by pleading guilty and punishing
one who has denied his guilt and proceeded to trial is elusive, to say the least.”).
168
See, e.g., Thomas M. Uhlman & N. Darlene Walker, “He Takes Some of My Time; I Take Some
of His”: An Analysis of Judicial Sentencing Patterns in Jury Cases, 14 L. & SOC’Y REV. 323, 338 (1980).
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unlikely to impose different sentences.
The vast majority of criminal cases in the United States are handled by
publicly funded attorneys.169 In some jurisdictions, their wages are so low
that the “only way that appointed lawyers can . . . break even is to plead out
most of their cases very quickly, earning a series of small fees.”170 Low
wages also create a conflict of interest, incentivizing attorneys to focus their
energies on their private cases that pay better.171 Moreover, high caseloads
mean that many publicly funded defense attorneys cannot devote sufficient
time and resources to each case.172 In 2007, 73% of county-based public
defender’s offices “exceeded the maximum recommended limit of cases
received per attorney.”173 That number was even higher, 88%, for offices
that handled more than 5,000 cases per year.174 As a result, in many
jurisdictions, defense attorneys often only meet with clients for a few
minutes before entering a guilty plea175 and they lack the time to perform
meaningful investigation.176
169
See HARLOW, supra note 63, at 1 (reporting that 82% of felony state court defendants in the
largest seventy-five counties in the United States were represented by publicly funded attorneys in 1996).
170
Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to Lawyers, 70 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1287, 1292 (2013); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 7
(2004) (“Attorneys who do not receive sufficient compensation have a disincentive to devote the
necessary time and effort to provide meaningful representation or even participate in the system at all.”).
171
AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 170, at 27.
172
See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF
OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 7 (2009) (“Frequently, public defenders are asked to
represent far too many clients . . . . [T]heir caseloads make it impossible to practice law as they are
required to do according to the profession’s rules. They cannot interview their clients properly,
effectively seek their pretrial release, file appropriate motions, conduct necessary fact investigations,
negotiate responsibly with the prosecutor, [and] adequately prepare for hearings . . . .”); THE SUPREME
COURT OF OHIO, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON PRO SE &
INDIGENT LITIGANTS 36–37 (2006) (“Currently, criminal and civil indigent representation in Ohio is
seriously under-funded. Competent representation of indigent criminal defendants is constitutionally
mandated, yet the level of funding provided for that defense fails to allow for the minimum level of
competent representation to be universally provided.”); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 170, at 18
(discussing excessive caseloads and the effect it has on an attorney’s ability to make contact with clients).
173
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ 231175, COUNTYBASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007, at 1 (2010).
174
Id. at 10; see also id. (stating that 23% of all offices had “less than half of the number of litigating
attorneys required to meet the professional guidelines for the number of cases [they] received”).
175
See Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se
Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 975 (2012) (“[Non-capital f]elony defenders . . . have little
time to meet with their clients, particularly when a face-to-face meeting would require a long trip to a
distant jail. Their only communication with each client may be no more than a hurried conversation in a
courtroom hallway or holding cell in the few minutes before a court appearance. To manage their
crushing workloads, defense lawyers very often ‘meet ‘em and plead ‘em,’ pressing their clients to plead
guilty immediately before doing any investigation.”); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 170, at 16
(reporting that 83% of cases in a county in Louisiana and 42% of cases in a county in Mississippi were
resolved before defendants had the chance to meet with their attorneys out of court).
176
See See Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York
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Due to heavy caseloads, many defense attorneys may be unable to use
open-file to their clients’ full advantage. They may lack the time and
resources to examine the contents of a discovery package carefully. And
many files may not have a “smoking gun” that helps the defense without
requiring significant investigative follow-up.177 Indeed, the prosecution’s
file does not represent an impartial construction of the crime. It is instead
the product of a highly routinized process that is designed to produce
inculpatory evidence and that is carried out by police and prosecutors who
seek convictions. As an example, from the perspective of police officers, the
arrest report is “primarily an ‘internal memorandum’ serving the perceived
needs of the police department.”178 Its “primary function for the police is ‘to
justify the arrest and clear the case,’ [which] can be achieved by confining
reports to what is necessary to satisfy the probable cause standard, ignoring
exculpatory evidence.”179 There is also evidence that officers often fail to
collect, record, or transfer exculpatory evidence to the prosecution.180
In this context, the various effects of open-file—on police
investigations, on prosecutorial charging, on plea-bargaining, and on
sentencing—may be limited. Attorneys that lack the time to consult with
their clients also lack the time to closely review a case file or conduct a
rigorous follow-up investigation on its basis. This problem is particularly
acute given the broad substantive scope of open-file discovery and, in at least
some cases, the large size of the file.181

City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 762 (1987) (finding that defense attorneys in New York
visited crime scenes or interviewed witnesses in approximately 4% of non-homicide felonies, and that
they did so in just about 12% and 21% of homicides, respectively); see also Richard Klein, The Emperor
Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 665–66 (1986) (“[C]aseload pressures and insufficient funding
have led to widespread failings by defenders of their duty to investigate.”).
177
See supra Section IV.F.
178
Fisher, supra note 144, at 7–8.
179
Id. (citation omitted); see also Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater
Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 100 (1992)
(reporting on a non-randomly sampled survey of judges, public defenders and prosecutors, which found
that 86% of respondents “believe[d] that fabrication in case reports occurs at least ‘some of the time’”
and that 33% of respondents believed that “police fabricate evidence to create probable cause in case
reports between ‘half of the time’ and ‘most of the time’”).
180
A study of the arrest-report writing process concluded that “[m]ost police probably do not
generally report exculpatory evidence.” Fisher, supra note 1644, at 18. Officers are incentivized to
withhold exculpatory evidence from the file to prevent its use by the defense, to protect themselves from
embarrassment or liability, and because they lack to time to investigate, collect, or record exculpatory
evidence. Id. at 8–9, 21, 30. Police training materials are also partially responsible. See id. at 30
(concluding based on a review of writing manuals from six different states that “none of the training
materials addresses the importance of investigating, recording, or reporting exculpatory facts to avoid
punishment of a possibly innocent arrestee[, but rather they] reflect a psychological set in which the
arrestee’s guilt is presumed, and the only use of notes and reports in the criminal process is to ensure
conviction”).
181
See supra note 156.
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V. EMPIRICAL TRENDS
I next examine empirical evidence to help answer three main questions.
First, does prosecutorial disclosure increase as a result of open-file? Second,
do defendants fare better as a result of open-file—in charging, plea
bargaining, or sentencing? And third, does open-file decrease the trial rate
or speed up dispositions? After presenting the evidence, I consider how the
answers to these questions implicate some of the theoretical predictions
discussed earlier.
In attempting to answer these questions, I rely primarily on before-andafter comparisons using aggregate monthly or annual administrative data.
Of course, there are significant limitations to this methodological approach
both in terms of data and causal identification. Still, basic descriptive
information on how case processing does or does not change after the
adoption of open-file in two different states adds meaningful empirical
insight in an area of the literature where we know so little.
A. More Disclosure?
For open-file to affect the criminal process it must, at the very least,
change disclosure activity. The literature widely assumes that open-file both
increases and speeds up disclosure, but it offers relatively little empirical
evidence for support. One recent study surveyed prosecutors and defense
attorneys in North Carolina and Virginia—an adjacent state with a narrow
discovery statute—about how frequently particular categories of evidence
were disclosed.182 The respondents reported that prosecutors disclosed a
number of categories of evidence more frequently in North Carolina,
suggesting that open-file increased disclosure.183 Without data from before
open-file went into effect in North Carolina, however, we cannot know how
big the effect was.
To examine the effect of open-file statutes on disclosure activity we
would ideally have systematic data on the volume of discovery—perhaps
measured by the number of pages in the file—in a jurisdiction before and
after open-file went into effect.184 As a second-best proxy, I look to a
measure of suppression litigation: if prosecutors are disclosing more
evidence earlier in the criminal process before defendants enter guilty pleas,
then we would expect to see an increase in defendants filing motions to
suppress.
182
Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at 293–96 (explaining the results of a recent study that
surveyed prosecutors and defense attorneys in North Carolina and Virginia).
183
Id.
184
I tried to obtain this information by requesting access to the discovery logs held by a number of
public defender’s and district attorney’s offices. Most did not maintain such logs before the law went
into effect and one office refused to share its logs.
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Figure 1 depicts the number of motion-to-suppress hearings in the Texas
district courts each month from mid-2010 to mid-2015.185 The state
legislature enacted discovery reform in January 2013 (demarcated by the
dotted gray line) and the statute went into effect in January of the next year
(solid gray line).186 The number of hearings was relatively stable from mid2010 until the end of 2012 but then almost doubled in 2013 after the law was
enacted, suggesting that some counties may have begun implementing the
statutory requirements before they were legally required to do so. Hearings
continued to increase in 2014, after the law went into effect. This pattern
cannot be explained by an increase in cases, nor an increase in funding for
public defense.187
FIGURE 1: MONTHLY NUMBER OF MOTION-TO-SUPPRESS HEARINGS IN
TEXAS DISTRICT COURTS, 2010–2015188

185
The Texas district courts are trial courts of general jurisdiction over all felony cases. About Texas
Courts,
TEX.
JUDICIAL
BRANCH,
http://www.txcourts.gov/about-texas-courts/trial-courts/
[https://perma.cc/BRF7-2Q9W]. Some ambiguity in the data-reporting manual for the Texas Office of
Court Administration suggests that court clerks should include the number of motions to suppress rather
than the number of motion to suppress hearings. See OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., TEX. JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
OFFICIAL DISTRICT COURT MONTHLY REPORT INSTRUCTIONS 10 (2013). As a result, the figure may
sometimes include both.
186
S.B. 1611, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013) (codified as amended at TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN.
art. 39.14 (West 2015)).
187
See TEX. LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BD., ID 1365, INDIGENT DEFENSE 2 (2014),
http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/24677/1408LBB_Indigent_Defense.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TK2HE63W] (showing that indigent defense funding in Texas increased by just 9% from 2012 to 2014); see
also infra Figure 2 (showing that the number of cases filed in Texas district courts before and after the
enactment of open-file was relatively stable).
188
The data were obtained from the Texas Judicial Branch’s Trial Court Activity Database,
TXCOURTS, http://www.txcourts.gov/statistics/trial-court-activity-database.aspx (follow “Run Reports”
hyperlink for Sept. 2010 to present; then select “District Court Data Reports” in the Report Type field;
then select “District Court Activity Detail” in the Report Field; then select continue; then choose
appropriate date range; then check box for “Separate Monthly Report;” then click Run Report) (last
visited Aug. 15, 2015). Data were not available from North Carolina.
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Figure 1 supports two empirical conclusions. First, it suggests that openfile increased enforcement of the Fourth Amendment by stimulating more
motions to suppress. Second, and more important for our purposes, it
provides systematic evidence—albeit through a proxy—that open-file
increased prosecutorial disclosure soon after the state enacted discovery
reform.
B. More Favorable Defense Outcomes?
Next, I present data to assess whether defendants obtained better case
outcomes as a result of open-file. I focus on charging, plea bargaining, and
sentencing.
1. Prosecutorial Charging
As noted earlier, open-file discovery could produce more favorable
outcomes for defendants at the charging stage by increasing the stringency
of prosecutors’ charging standards or diminishing the incentive to
overcharge.189 We can look for evidence of such changes by examining
several kinds of data.
Most simply, open-file statutes might decrease the number of cases in
which the government files criminal charges. Figure 2 displays filing data
over time for Texas and North Carolina. The upper panel shows that the
number of felony filings in the Texas district courts was relatively stable
before and after the state’s open-file statute was enacted in January 2013 and
went into effect one year later. The lower panel shows the number of felony
cases filed in the North Carolina superior courts by fiscal year (July–June).
Felony filings increased slightly after the state’s open-file statute was
enacted and went into effect in fiscal year 2005.190 The data provide little
evidence that discovery reform resulted in fewer criminal filings.

See supra Section IV.B.
S.B. 52, 2003 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2004) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A902 (West 2016)).
189
190
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FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF FELONY COURT FILINGS IN TEXAS AND NORTH
CAROLINA191

Admittedly, the number of cases filed per year is a rough measure of the
stringency of prosecutorial charge screening practices. A prosecutor’s office
could increase charging standards and file an equal number of criminal cases
if the crime rate increased, thus expanding the pool of cases with sufficient
evidence to meet the heightened charging standards. State-level measures of
reported index offenses and all arrests from the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Reports help diminish these concerns. Indeed, none of the examined states
experienced substantial increases in reported person or property index
crimes after discovery reform.192 And arrests for person, property, drug, and
other offenses remained relatively stable or decreased after discovery reform
in those states.193
191
The North Carolina data were obtained from the North Carolina Courts’ annual statistical
summaries. See, e.g., N.C. COURTS, STATISTICAL AND OPERATIONAL SUMMARY OF THE JUDICIAL
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT FOR YEAR JULY 1, 2005–JUNE 30, 2006 (2006). The Texas data were obtained
from the Trial Court Activity Database. See supra note 188.
192
See infra App. Figure 1.
193
See infra App. Figure 2.
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Even if open-file has little effect on whether the prosecutor’s office files
charges against a suspect, it might still affect the number of charges or counts
brought in individual cases. Thus, a second useful source of data about
charging is the average number of charges brought per case. Figure 3
displays the average number of felony and misdemeanor charges filed in
cases in North Carolina Superior Court by fiscal year.194 The average
number of felonies was relatively stable in the years before and after the state
adopted open-file in fiscal year 2005. Other than a continuation of a
preexisting trend, there is no evidence of an increase in misdemeanors either.
Thus, Figure 3 provides little evidence that open-file led prosecutors in
North Carolina to file fewer felony or misdemeanor charges in individual
cases.
FIGURE 3: AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHARGES PER CASE IN NORTH
CAROLINA SUPERIOR COURT, FY 2000–2007195

Finally, even if open-file has little effect on the number of cases or the
average number of charges filed, it might still affect the composition of cases
brought. It might, for example, lead prosecutors to downgrade robbery
charges to theft, or downgrade burglary charges to breaking and entering.
Beginning with North Carolina, the number of criminal cases filed in
superior court for most charge categories—including burglaries, larceny,
robbery, assault, arson, murder, manslaughter, rape, and other sex
Data on the average number of charges filed in Texas were not available.
N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, Automatic Criminal/Infractions System (2015). For more
information, see N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, Automatic Criminal/Infractions System, N.C. COURT
SYS., http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/JData/Documents/Technology_ACIS_Facts.pdf [https://perma.
cc/GQ4E-FZ8K] (last visited Nov. 25, 2016). Data are on all charge categories.
194
195
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offenses—was relatively stable over time.
There are only three
exceptions: drug, forgery and uttering, and “other” offenses.197
Based on the data available, I cannot identify with certainty the precise
cause of these changes in filing volume. But there isn’t much reason to think
that open-file was responsible. The filing rate for forgery and uttering was
relatively stable before North Carolina adopted its open-file statute, and then
it dropped precipitously soon after,198 which is consistent with the theory
that open-file leads prosecutors to file charges in fewer cases. But the arrest
rate for financial crimes in North Carolina followed precisely the same
precipitous pattern,199 which was also consistent with a national trend during
the same period.200 Indeed, from 2004 to 2010, the number of arrests for
“forgery/counterfeiting” fell by 33% nationwide.201 The increase in filings
for drug crimes is harder to explain given that the number of arrests for both
drug possession and trafficking offenses was stable while court filings
increased.202 Nevertheless, this pattern is not consistent with the theory that
discovery reform led to more stringent charging standards. The same can be
said for the increase in filings for “other” crimes.203
Moving on to Texas, the volume of criminal filings in the district court
for most charges—including capital murder, murder, other homicides,
robbery, aggravated assault, sexual assault of a minor, family violence,
automobile theft, theft, “other” felonies, and “other” misdemeanors—
remained relatively stable after the open-file law was adopted and went into
effect.204 The exceptions are drug trafficking and drug possession—which
increased after Texas’s discovery statute was enacted in 2013—and
burglary, driving while intoxicated (DWI), and sexual assault of an adult—
which decreased.205 As in North Carolina, the increase in drug filings cannot
be fully explained by an increase in drug arrests, but it is also not consistent
with the direction of the theorized effect of open-file on charging.206 On the
other hand, the decrease in filings for burglary, DWI, and sexual assaults is
196

See infra App. Figure 3. The data indicate the most severe charge in each case.
See infra id.
198
See infra id.
199
See infra App. Figure 5.
200
BUREAU
OF
JUST.
STATISTICS,
ARREST
DATA
ANALYSIS
TOOL,
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/RYM2-G79A] (last
visited Feb. 1, 2016) (click “National Estimates”; then click “Trend Graphs by Sex”; then select “Forgery
and Counterfeiting”; then click “Make Counts Graph”).
201
Id.
202
Compare infra App. Figure 3 and infra App. Figure 5.
203
The increase in “other” filings is at least partially attributable to administrative data collection
procedures. Charges are assigned a crime category using a statute look-up table. Because the look-up
table was not updated between 1999 and 2007, charges filed under new statutes enacted by the legislature
during that period are labeled as “other.”
204
See infra App. Figure 4. More precisely, the data indicate the most severe charge in each case.
205
See infra id.
206
See infra App. Figure 6.
196
197
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consistent with the theory that open-file encourages more stringent charging
standards. But, at least for the first two crime categories, for which there is
arrest data, this trend more likely reflects a drop in arrests.207
To summarize, the filing rates for a large majority of crime categories in
North Carolina and Texas were stable before and after each state adopted its
respective discovery statute. A few of the exceptions to this general pattern
reflect increases in filings, which is not consistent with the theory that openfile encourages more stringent charging standards. And the few charge
categories that decreased in filings after discovery reform were also
accompanied by substantial reductions in arrests. While my data cannot fully
resolve whether open-file affected charging—we need charge-level data
from each state to do so—they provide relatively little evidence that openfile led prosecutors to file fewer cases, or to file fewer or different charges
within cases.
Still, the data clearly show some changes in the composition of the
judicial caseload. While changes in the caseload are common,208 they pose a
methodological challenge for exploring the effects of open-file on
subsequent stages in the criminal process. As a partial solution, in the
following subsections I try where possible to present data that exclude the
crime categories for which there is a significant compositional change.209
2. Plea Bargaining
Many scholars and policymakers have predicted that open-file may
enable defendants to obtain more favorable outcomes through plea
bargaining. They might, for example, obtain more dismissals. My data
suggest otherwise. Figure 4 shows the dismissal rate in the Texas district
courts, which was relatively stable after the law was enacted and went into
effect.

See infra id.
See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS,
TABLE D-2, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS COMMENCED, BY MAJOR OFFENSE
(EXCLUDING TRANSFERS), DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING MARCH 31, 2000 THROUGH 2004
(2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics2004 [https://perma.cc/E8GC-HQCQ] (showing substantial inter-year variation in the composition of
charges in federal court).
209
In North Carolina, those crimes are drug, forgery and uttering, and “other” offenses. In Texas,
they are drug possession, drug trafficking, burglary, sexual assault of adults, and DWI.
207
208

2017]

THE FRAGILE PROMISE OF OPEN-FILE DISCOVERY

815

FIGURE 4: DISMISSAL RATES IN TEXAS, 2010–2015

210

Figure 5 depicts the dismissal rate in North Carolina by fiscal year (July–
June) for the superior courts (black line), which primarily handle felonies,
and where the open-file statute applies. Other than a continuation of a
preexisting trend, there is no evidence of an uptick in dismissals. Moreover,
the dismissal rate in the district courts (gray line)—which primarily handle
misdemeanors to which the open-file statute does not apply—followed a
roughly similar upward trend.
FIGURE 5: DISMISSAL RATES IN NORTH CAROLINA BY COURT, 2000–2007211

Even if defendants do not obtain more dismissals, they might still
negotiate more favorable plea agreements. Again, my data suggest
The Texas data were obtained from the Trial Court Activity Database. See supra note 188.
The North Carolina data were obtained from annual statistical reports published by the state’s
court system. See supra note 191. Throughout the paper, the denominator for North Carolina district
court disposition rates—the total number of misdemeanor cases disposed in district court—is calculated
by subtracting felony intermediate dispositions (i.e., felony bound over to superior court, felony probable
cause not found, felony hearing waived) from the total number of dispositions for criminal non-motor
vehicle offenses in district court.
210
211
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otherwise. To test this claim we would ideally have data on the charges filed
and convicted in each case disposed by guilty plea. While publicly available
data at this level of granularity on state courts is rare, North Carolina
publishes data on the proportion of cases in which the defendant enters a
guilty plea to a reduced charge on the top charge in a case. Figure 6 shows
that the rate of these dispositions was relatively stable after open-file went
into effect, with a very small increase in fiscal year 2005.212
FIGURE 6: PROPORTION OF CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA DISPOSED BY
GUILTY PLEA TO LESSER CHARGE, FY 2000–2007213

In many jurisdictions, defendants can also obtain more favorable plea
agreements through pretrial diversion procedures. In Texas, a substantial
fraction of felony cases are disposed by a deferred adjudication, which
allows first-time offenders to enter a guilty plea and receive probation
without a criminal conviction.214 Figure 7 displays the proportion of
disposed cases by year that result in a deferred adjudication. It offers little
evidence that defendants secured more deferred adjudications as a result of
Texas’s discovery law.

212
Unlike for dismissals, data on the rate of pleas to lesser offenses are not available for the district
courts in North Carolina. Data on Texas were also not available.
213
The North Carolina data were obtained from annual statistical reports published by the state’s
court system. See supra note 191.
214
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 42.12 § 5 (West 2015). Deferred adjudications are also available
in North Carolina, but they are used in just a few hundred of the roughly 100,000 felony cases disposed
per year.
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FIGURE 7: PERCENT OF TEXAS DISTRICT COURT CASES DISPOSED
THROUGH A DEFERRED ADJUDICATION, 2010–2015215

3. Sentencing
Open-file could result in more favorable outcomes for defendants at the
sentencing stage by increasing the probability of receiving probation rather
than incarceration or by decreasing the average sentence length.
Figure 8 shows the proportion of convicted defendants in felony cases
where the court imposed jail time, prison time, or probation in Texas. The
most glaring feature of the data is the abrupt increase in prison sentences and
decrease in probation sentences in the first quarter of 2013. The precise
timing of these disruptions—that is, just a few months after the Texas
legislature adopted the new discovery statute—suggests that open-file
cannot offer any explanation (and if it could, it would only suggest that openfile led to more severe sentences).216 The more important pattern is that
sentencing was otherwise stable from 2013 to 2015, with a slightly larger
number of convicted defendants receiving jail time rather than probation.
Figure 9 provides similar data for North Carolina, showing the
proportion of convicted felony defendants who receive a sentence of
community supervision, broken down by charge type. For all crime
categories except “Other,” which accounts for just 10% of convictions, the
proportion of cases receiving community supervision decreased or remained
stable after open-file went into effect.”

215
216

The Texas data were obtained from the Trial Court Activity Database. See supra note 188.
One possibility is that these patterns reflect a change in data collection.

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

818

[Vol. 49:771

FIGURE 8: PROPORTION OF CONVICTED FELONY DEFENDANTS IN
TEXAS DISTRICT COURT RECEIVING JAIL, PRISON, AND PROBATION
SENTENCES, 2010–2015217

FIGURE 9: PROPORTION OF CONVICTED FELONY DEFENDANTS IN
NORTH CAROLINA SUPERIOR COURT RECEIVING COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION BY CRIME CATEGORY, FY 2001–2007218

The Texas data were obtained from the Trial Court Activity Database. See supra note 188. “Jail”
includes sentences to both state and local jails.
218
Data were obtained from annual reports published by the North Carolina sentencing commission.
See, e.g., N.C. SENTENCING & POL’Y ADVISORY COMM’N, STRUCTURED SENTENCING STATISTICAL
REPORT FOR FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS, FISCAL YEAR 2003/04 tbl.5 (2005) (showing all felony
convictions for the fiscal year broken down by crime category and sentence type). Community
supervision includes both “intermediate” and “community” punishment.
217
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Open-file might also help defendants decrease the length of prison
sentences. The upper panel of Figure 10 shows the average sentence length
over time in fiscal years (September–August) in Texas among defendants
who received a sentence of incarceration. The graph shows that the average
sentence of defendants convicted of violent, property, drug, and other
offenses remained relatively stable in fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015,
after the law was enacted and put into effect.
The lower panel of Figure 10 shows the average minimum jail or prison
sentence in North Carolina among all convicted defendants (including those
that did not receive any jail or prison time at all) by fiscal year. Sentence
lengths for property and drug offenders increased slightly after open-file
went into effect. Sentence lengths decreased very slightly for person crimes
in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 and somewhat more for “Other” offenses. On
the whole, there is little evidence of a substantial reduction in sentences due
to open-file. This pattern of continuity is present even if we focus in on the
most serious cases, such as homicide, rape, robbery, and burglary,219 where
the effect of open-file may be greatest due to higher volumes of evidence.

219
See App. Figure 7. Data on sentence lengths for specific charge categories were not available
in Texas.
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FIGURE 10: AVERAGE LENGTH OF PRISON/JAIL SENTENCE AMONG
CONVICTED FELONY DEFENDANTS IN TEXAS AND NORTH CAROLINA220

220
The Texas data were obtained from annual statistical reports published by the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice. See, e.g., TEXAS DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST., STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2008
(2008) (showing separately the average sentence length of defendants who receive jail and prison
sentences). I combine the jail and prison sentence length averages together by multiplying each by the
number of relevant convicted defendants, and then by dividing that number by the total number of
convicted defendants. Thus, the data reflect the average sentence length among defendants who received
a sentence of incarceration (whether in prison or jail). The North Carolina data were obtained from annual
reports published by the North Carolina sentencing commission. See supra note 218. They reflect the
average incarceration spell among all convicted defendants, including those who did not receive any
incarceration. To calculate the average prison sentence among all convicted defendants, I multiplied the
average minimum active sentence by the number of convicted defendants receiving active sentences and
divided it by the number of all convicted defendants.
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To summarize, the data examined here provide little evidence that
defendants obtained more favorable outcomes after the adoption of openfile in North Carolina or Texas. Indeed, defendants on average did not
receive more favorable charges, negotiate more favorable settlements, or
obtain less severe sentences.
C. Fewer Trials, Faster Dispositions?
I next bring data to bear on the conventional wisdom that open-file
decreases trials and speeds up dispositions. On the whole, that wisdom is not
supported. Figure 11 shows that the proportion of cases going to trial in the
North Carolina superior courts—where the open-file law applies—
decreased slightly after open-file went into effect, though the downward
trend began several years earlier and mirrored a similar trend in the district
courts, where the open-file law does not apply.
FIGURE 11: TRIAL RATE IN NORTH CAROLINA, 2000–2007221

Figure 12 tells a more complicated story in Texas. There, the trial rate
increased dramatically in 2013—the year the state enacted its open-file
law—and then promptly fell back down to its pre-2013 level in the end of
2014—the year the law went into effect. One possibility is that an exogenous
shock triggered a surge in trials in 2013, which then may have been reduced
by open-file. But a better explanation is that—as suggested by Figure 1—
counties in Texas began implementing open-file discovery in 2013 before
the legal requirements took effect, which introduced a shock into case
processing that eventually fell back to the original level. Longer follow-up
data would be helpful to better assess these trends.
221
The North Carolina data were obtained from annual statistical reports published by the state’s
court system. See supra note 191.
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FIGURE 12: TRIAL RATE IN TEXAS, 2010–2015222

Scholars and policy advocates have also predicted that open-file speeds
up guilty pleas. To test this hypothesis, Figure 13 depicts the proportion of
cases in the Texas district courts that were disposed within 90 days, 91–180
days, 181–365 days, and over 365 days. Contrary to the predictions, each of
the curves are relatively stable after the open-file statute was enacted and
went into effect.
FIGURE 13: DISTRIBUTION OF AGE OF CASES IN TEXAS, 2010–2015223

Turning to North Carolina, Figure 14 shows the average county-level
age of the fiftieth- (or median) and ninetieth-percentile case in each county
in the superior courts by fiscal year. The fiftieth-percentile case, which is
222
223

The Texas data were obtained from Trial Court Activity Database. See supra note 188.
Id.
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most likely disposed by guilty plea or dismissal, increases over time at a
stable rate both before and after open-file went into effect in North Carolina.
The curve for the age of the ninetieth-percentile case, which is
disproportionately likely to go to trial, follows a similar pattern. Taken
together, the publicly available data on time-to-disposition—while far from
perfect—provide little evidence that cases were disposed more quickly after
states adopted more liberal discovery policies.
FIGURE 14: AVERAGE COUNTY-LEVEL 50TH AND 90TH PERCENTILE AGE
OF CASES AT DISPOSITION BY COURT, FY 1999–2006224

224
The data were obtained from annual statistical reports published by the state’s court system. See
supra note 191.
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D. Why Has Open-File Fallen Short?
Painting with a broad brush, the data presented here do not support the
conventional wisdom about the effects of open-file discovery. Indeed,
defendants in North Carolina and Texas did not, on average, fare better in
terms of the charges they faced, the pleas they negotiated, or the sentences
they received after the adoption of open-file. And there’s little evidence that
open-file reduced the trial rate or sped up dispositions. I now step back for a
moment to consider why.
One possibility is that open-file had little effect on prosecutorial
disclosure in North Carolina or Texas, not because of non-compliance, but
because prosecutors already had significant incentives to engage in
voluntary disclosure beforehand.225 In other words, in many counties there
may have been little room for improvement. This explanation seems unlikely
for a few reasons. To begin with, survey data from North Carolina suggests
that disclosure rates are higher than in neighboring Virginia, where the
governing discovery statute is especially narrow.226 Moreover, my data show
that motions to suppress in Texas increased dramatically after the state
enacted its open-file statute.227 This suggests that defense attorneys filed
more motions to suppress because they began to receive more disclosure,
earlier in the process.
The flip side is the possibility that open-file had little effect because of
widespread government non-compliance. While I can’t conclusively reject
this possibility, my own conversations with defense attorneys in North
Carolina suggest that the government is reasonably compliant with the
statute. The recent survey of defense attorneys in North Carolina provides
more systematic data in support of that conclusion.228 If defense attorneys—
the people most likely to complain—are not dissatisfied, that provides good
evidence that the government is complying most of the time.
A third possible explanation is that, prior to open-file, defendants
systematically overestimated the amount of inculpatory evidence held by the
prosecution rather than systematically underestimating it.229 And a fourth,
related explanation is that after the enactment of open-file, psychological
biases may have led the defense to interpret the contents of the prosecutorial
file in a self-serving manner.230 But if either of these two theories held, after
the implementation of open-file we would expect an increase in the trial rate,
an increase in the time-to-disposition, and more favorable outcomes for the

See supra Section II.
Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at 293–94.
227
See discussion supra Section V.A.
228
Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at 323 tbl.2a.
229
See supra Section IV.C.
230
Id.
225
226
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defendant at some stage in the process. The data support none of these
predictions.
A fifth—and perhaps best—explanation is that heavy caseloads
prevented defense attorneys from effectively using the prosecutorial file to
their clients’ advantage.232 Indeed, many attorneys may have lacked the time
and resources to examine the contents of discovery packages carefully.
Moreover, the typical package likely contains no “smoking guns”—only
suggestive leads that would require time-consuming investigative followup.233 That’s particularly true if, as I have suggested, police and prosecutors
may adapt to open-file by changing their investigative practices.234
This theory appears most consistent with the basic pattern of my results:
if many defense attorneys lack the time and resources to use open-file to
their clients’ advantage, we would expect little change in charging, plea
bargaining, or sentencing. The theory is also consistent with data on public
defense funding in North Carolina and Texas: around the time of their
discovery reforms, per capita indigent defense funding in both states was
below the national average.235 Texas had the third lowest in the nation.236
If my interpretation of the data is right, then the effects of open-file are
fragile and contingent on institutional circumstances. And, as a result, openfile may not level the criminal justice playing field as much as we hope. It
may simply not be possible to substitute an independent investigation led by
the defense with an investigation by the government. We may therefore need
to integrate discovery legislation into a package of reforms that both increase
funding for indigent defense237 and further reinforce the government’s duty
to disclose. A number of legislative enforcement options could help,
including recording requirements for police investigations, statutory duties
on the police to transfer all discoverable evidence to the prosecution, a
231

See supra Sections II.A & IV.C.
See supra Section IV.F.
233
See supra Section IV.F.
234
See supra Section IV.A.
235
See HOLLY R. STEVENS ET AL., STATE, COUNTY AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT
DEFENSE SERVICES, FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 75–76 (2010) (providing data on indigent defense spending
in each state in 2008).
236
Id.; see also Brandi Grissom, Advocates: Texas Indigent Defense Nearing Crisis, TEX. TRIB.
(May 19, 2010, 5:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2010/05/19/advocates-texas-indigent-defensenearing-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/ZL6M-3KBV] (“Texas is reaching a crisis point, putting itself at risk of
a civil rights lawsuit—or worse, a total meltdown of the criminal justice system—because it so severely
shortchanges the system designed to ensure impoverished accused criminals get adequate legal
representation . . . .”).
237
An extensive legal literature discusses the political obstacles to increasing public defense
funding. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from
Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 808–10 (2004); Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed:
Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 894–906
(1993). And admittedly, substantial increases may not be politically feasible in many jurisdictions. My
point is simply that open-file may make little difference without adequate public defense funding.
231
232
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criminal prohibition on intentional non-compliance with the discovery
statute, protections against exploding plea offers, and access to indexed or
electronic and searchable versions of the file.238
CONCLUSION
Aside from evidence that open-file increased prosecutorial disclosure
and invigorated enforcement of the Fourth Amendment, the data presented
here provide little evidence that open-file discovery had much of an effect
on charging, plea bargaining, sentencing, trial rates, or time-to-disposition
in North Carolina or Texas. While I cannot rule out all theoretical
possibilities, this pattern of results is most consistent with the theory that,
due to heavy caseloads, defense attorneys lacked the time and resources to
use the file to their clients’ advantage. The potential effects of open-file
might also have been mitigated by the adaptive behavior of police and
prosecutors in the collection of evidence and assembly of the file.
While my analysis therefore suggests that discovery reform should be
coupled with increased funding for indigent defense and stronger
compliance mechanisms, there is still much work to be done before we can
draw firm normative conclusions. To nudge the literature in that direction, I
close by sketching out a research agenda for future empirical work on openfile discovery that identifies key research questions, promising
methodological approaches, and potential sources of data.
A first strand of research would examine the same questions explored
here—the effects of open-file on the content, timing and method of
disposition of case outcomes—but with more granular data and stronger
methods of causal inference. To begin with, we need case-level or, even
better, charge-level data on criminal cases in a given jurisdiction before and
after the enactment of open-file. To obtain more precise causal estimates,
empirical scholars should employ multivariate regression or matching to
adjust for observable changes in the composition of the criminal caseload.
Studies could also apply difference-in-differences designs by exploiting
subsets of cases that are not affected by a state’s discovery reform (e.g.,
misdemeanors in North Carolina).239
Future research could also examine whether open-file is more effective
in certain groups of cases than others. For example, it could explore the
effect of open-file for defendants represented by private attorneys who have
more resources to leverage discovery materials.
The second area of research concerns how open-file discovery affects
For a more detailed discussion of these mechanisms, see supra Section III.
The difference-in-differences design is a common methodological approach in the court
literature. See, e.g., Albert Yoon, Damage Caps and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical
Malpractice Litigation in the South, 3 AM. L. ECON. REV. 199, 212–15 (2001) (examining the effect of
damage caps in civil litigation on plaintiff recovery).
238
239
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the disclosure practices of prosecutors. The scholarly literature widely
assumes that open-file increases the volume and speeds up the timing of
disclosure, but we have relatively little systematic data to test this hypothesis
directly. One recent study surveyed prosecutors and defense attorneys in
North Carolina and Virginia about the frequency with which particular
categories of evidence are currently disclosed.240 The data show that
prosecutors disclose many categories of evidence more frequently in North
Carolina than in Virginia, suggesting that open-file increases disclosure.
Additional data on disclosure practices in North Carolina before open-file
went into effect would be particularly helpful in answering these questions.
Some public defender’s offices maintain a discovery log that captures basic
information like the case number, the date of receipt, and the number of
pages or boxes. Such logs could be used to measure both the timing and
volume of formal discovery before and after open-file goes into effect.
A third potential area of research would evaluate a long-standing
counter-argument to discovery reform: that broad discovery policies
increase witness intimidation and evidence tampering.241 We have little
systematic empirical evidence on point. The strongest methodological
strategy would combine administrative data on the number of witnessintimidation and evidence-tampering charges filed over time with qualitative
data on the experiences of prosecutors and defense attorneys.242 Evidence
about whether and when open-file encourages witness intimidation and
evidence tampering would be valuable to other states in deciding whether to
enact open-file legislation and in crafting discovery provisions that minimize
these risks.
A fourth potential strand could use open-file to answer a distinct but
related empirical question. For decades, legal scholars have debated whether
the plea-trial differential—that is, the difference between the sentences of
defendants who plead guilty and those that go to trial—represents a plea
discount or a trial penalty.243 As noted earlier, much rides on this question.244
If the differential is a discount, then plea bargaining is not coercive; it merely
expands the range of choices available to defendants. But if the differential
is a penalty, then, it coerces defendants to plead guilty by otherwise
Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at 323.
See State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 1953) (“[Liberal fact-finding procedures] will lead . . .
to perjury and the suppression of evidence . . . . [Moreover] the criminal defendant who is informed of
the names of all the State’s witnesses may take steps to bribe or frighten them . . . .”).
242
One survey asked attorneys in North Carolina about the “major disadvantages of ‘open-file’ preplea discovery.” Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at 395. Six (out of fifty-eight) surveyed prosecutors
identified witness intimidation as a problem, but none provided a specific example where they believed
open-file was causally responsible. Id. at 359–60.
243
See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 167, at 659 (analyzing the distinction between penalties and
discounts in plea bargaining).
244
See supra Section IV.E.
240
241
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punishing them for exercising their constitutional rights. There are few
more important empirical questions for the American criminal justice
system, which is dominated by plea bargaining.246
Once again, the literature offers little empirical guidance. Despite the
efforts of some scholars,247 we cannot infer trial penalties from the mere
existence of a plea-trial differential: in a world of static litigation costs, both
the penalty and discount theories fit observed reality equally. But as I have
argued here, open-file discovery changes the distribution of litigation costs
at different phases of the criminal process.248 If the plea-trial differential
represents a discount, we would expect the differential to increase for
defendants who enter guilty pleas early and waive their open-file rights, and
thus save the prosecution discovery costs. On the other hand, if the
differential represents a penalty, we would expect no change for early
pleaders but would expect an increase for late pleaders who exercise their
open-file rights. Open-file, then, offers an opportunity to test whether the
plea-trial differential primarily represents a discount or a penalty. And if the
latter is the answer, it is all the more important for legislatures to invigorate
public defense through broader discovery, stronger government enforcement
mechanisms, and increased funding.
245

Id.
See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“[Plea bargaining] is the criminal
justice system.”).
247
See, e.g., Uhlman & Walker, supra note 168, at 338.
248
See supra Section IV.E.
245
246
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APPENDIX
APP. FIGURE 1: UCR INDEX OFFENSES IN TEXAS AND NORTH
CAROLINA, BY OFFENSE TYPE249

249
The Texas data were obtained from the Texas Department of Public Safety’s annual statistical
reports. See, e.g., TEXAS DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, THE TEXAS CRIME REPORT FOR 2010 (2010). These
data exclude rape because the UCR updated coding procedures for that crime in 2014. See DEPT. OF
JUST., UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013 (2013) (released fall 2014),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/recent-program-updates/reporting-rape-in-2013-revised
[https://perma.cc/RQ7NCNZG]. The number of reported property offenses was divided by five. The North Carolina data were
obtained from the North Carolina Department of Public Safety’s annual summary reports. See View
Crime Statistics, CRIMEREPORTING, http://crimereporting.ncsbi.gov/Reports.aspx (last visited Feb.1,
2016) (select year “2007”; then click “submit”; then click “Statewide Offenses and Rates, Ten Year
Trend”).

830

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:771

APP. FIGURE 2: UCR ARRESTS IN TEXAS AND NORTH CAROLINA250

250
The Texas data were obtained from the Texas Department of Public Safety’s annual statistical
crime reports. See supra note 250. The number of “Other” arrests in Texas was divided by 10. The North
Carolina data were obtained from the North Carolina Department of Public Safety’s annual summary
reports. See N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, View Crime Statistics, CRIMEREPORTING,
http://crimereporting.ncsbi.gov/Reports.aspx (last visited Feb.1, 2016) (select year “2007”; then click
“submit”; then click “Arrests and Clearances”; then click “Arrests of Offense, Ten Year Trends”).
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APP. FIGURE 3: CASES FILED IN NORTH CAROLINA COURTS, BY MOST
SEVERE CHARGE251

251
The North Carolina data were obtained from annual statistical reports published by the state’s
court system. See supra note 191.
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APP. FIGURE 4. CASES FILED IN TEXAS DISTRICT COURTS, BY MOST
SEVERE CHARGE252

252

The Texas data were obtained from the Trial Court Activity Database. See supra note 188.
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APP. FIGURE 5: NUMBER OF ARRESTS IN NORTH CAROLINA FOR SPECIFIC
CRIME CATEGORIES, 1999-2007253

253
The data were obtained from the North Carolina Department of Public Safety annual summary
reports. See supra N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, supra note 251.
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APP. FIGURE 6: NUMBER OF ARRESTS IN TEXAS FOR SPECIFIC CRIME
CATEGORIES, 2010-2014254

APP. FIGURE 7: AVERAGE SENTENCE LENGTH FOR SPECIFIC CHARGE
CATEGORIES IN NORTH CAROLINA, FY 2001–2007255

The data were obtained from the Texas Department of Public Safety’s annual statistical reports.
See supra note 250.
255
Data were obtained from annual reports published by the North Carolina sentencing commission.
For more information, see supra note 218. They reflect the average incarceration spell among all
convicted defendants, including those who did not receive any incarceration. To calculate the average
prison sentence among all convicted defendants, I multiplied the average minimum active sentence by
the number of convicted defendants receiving active sentences and divided it by the number of all
convicted defendants. Data on first-degree-murder were excluded because state law mandates a sentence
of life without parole or death.
254
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